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New York

President:	Mr. Trump/Mrs. Haley	(United States of America)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Morales Ayma
	China	Mr. Wang Yi
	Côte d'Ivoire	Mr. Kablan Duncan
	Equatorial Guinea	Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
	Ethiopia	Mr. Negewo
	France	Mr. Macron
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Abdrakhmanov
	Kuwait	Mr. Al Sabah
	Netherlands	Mr. Rutte
	Peru	Mr. Vizcarra Cornejo
	Poland	Mr. Duda
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Ms. Wallström
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mrs. May

Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Maintenance of international peace and security

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The President: I am honoured to be here today to preside over this meeting of the Security Council. It is also my privilege to welcome the Heads of State and Government, Ministers and other leaders and representatives here with us in the Chamber. I also wish to warmly welcome Secretary-General António Guterres and thank him for joining us.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the President of the United States of America.

It is a great honour to be here today at this Security Council meeting to discuss a matter of urgent importance concerning countering the proliferation of deadly chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The nations of the world have long recognized that certain weapons are so dangerous and can inflict so much suffering that all of us have a vital interest in preventing their further development, spread and use.

Since my inauguration, the United States has taken bold action to confront such sinister threats. Many of us are rightly focused on the dangers of nuclear weapons, but we must never forget the risk posed by biological and chemical weapons. The United States was one of the first nations to unilaterally renounce the use of biological weapons and, since the First World War, we have led international efforts against the scourge of chemical warfare.

Most recently, in Syria we have twice imposed severe consequences on the Al-Assad regime for using chemical weapons against innocent civilians. I want to thank Prime Minister May and President Macron for their countries' close partnership in those efforts in April. The Syrian regime's butchery is enabled by Russia and Iran. The Iranian regime exports violence, terror and turmoil. It illicitly procured sensitive items to advance its ballistic missile programme and proliferates those missiles all across the Middle East. The regime is the world's leading sponsor of terror and fuels conflict across the region and far beyond. A regime with that track record must never be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon.

For that reason, I announced earlier this year that the United States would withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. That horrible, one-sided deal allowed Iran to continue its path towards a bomb and gave the regime a cash lifeline when they needed it the most. They were in big trouble. They needed cash, and we gave it to them. In the years since the deal was signed, Iran's aggression only increased. The regime used new funds from the deal to support terrorism, build nuclear-capable missiles and foment chaos.

Following America's withdrawal, the United States began reimposing nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. All United States nuclear-related sanctions will be in full force by early November. They will be in full force. After that, the United States will pursue additional sanctions — tougher than ever before — to counter the entire range of Iran's malign conduct. Any individual or entity who fails to comply with those sanctions will face severe consequences. I ask all members of the Security Council to work with the United States to ensure that the Iranian regime changes its behaviour and never acquires a nuclear bomb.

With all of that said, I want to thank Iran, Russia and Syria, for — at my very strong urging and request — they have substantially slowed down their attack on the governorate of Idlib and the 3 million people who live there, in order to get 25,000 targeted terrorists. Get the terrorists; but I hope the restraint continues after they get the terrorists. The world is watching. I would also like to thank Turkey for helping to negotiate restraint. Anything the United States of America can do to help resolve this problem in order to save, perhaps, hundreds of thousands of lives — maybe more — we are willing and able. We are available to help.

In my remarks yesterday to the General Assembly, I laid out my Administration's commitment to building a more just and peaceful future (see A/73/PV.6). Regrettably, we found that China has been attempting to interfere in our upcoming 2018 elections, to be held in November, against my Administration. They do not want me, or us, to win because I am the first President ever to challenge China on trade, and we are winning on trade. We are winning at every level. We do not want them to meddle or interfere in our upcoming elections.

As I also mentioned yesterday, we have seen the results of historic efforts to open new pathways to peace on the Korean peninsula, of which we are extremely proud. I am pleased to say that North Korea has not conducted a missile test since last November. It has not conducted a nuclear test since last September. And the hostages have been returned to us. Very importantly, the remains of American heroes are now returning home.

In June, I held a historic summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un in Singapore, where he reaffirmed his commitment to complete denuclearization. Last week, Chairman Kim reiterated that commitment to President Moon Jae-in at their third summit, and to me in the form of a very strong letter. I think we will make a deal. But, unfortunately, to ensure this progress continues, we must enforce existing Security Council resolutions until denuclearization occurs.

However, we have detected that some nations are already violating those United Nations sanctions. That includes illegal ship-to-ship transfers, which must end immediately. The safety of the Korean peninsula, the region and the world depends on full compliance with Security Council resolutions. That is very important.

Most importantly, however, I believe that Chairman Kim Jong Un, a man I have gotten to know and like, wants peace and prosperity for North Korea. Many things are happening behind the scenes, away from the media, that nobody knows about, but they are happening nevertheless and they are happening in a very positive way. So I think the international community will have some very good news coming from North Korea in the coming months and years.

I also very much appreciate what President Moon of South Korea had to say about me last night in television interviews. Working with President Moon has been my great honour. Likewise, working with President Xi of China and Prime Minister Abe of Japan has been a pleasure and an honour. Each of us follows in the footsteps of countless world leaders, diplomats and public servants who came to the United Nations with the same noble goal: to build a future worthy of the patriots — true patriots — who sacrificed their lives for our nations and for our future. To be successful, we need a commitment of every nation represented in this Chamber. Acting together, we can replace the horrors of war with the blessings of safety and the beautiful promise of peace.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now invite His Excellency Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of France, to take the floor.

President Macron (*spoke in French*): First of all, I would like to thank the United States presidency of the Security Council for convening us today to address the serious threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for being present with us today.

The first question that comes to mind with regard to this issue as I contemplate our differences — speaking frankly — over the past year on such important issues as Iranian nuclear power and the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, is simply: "What is it that we, the States members of the Security Council, still want to do together?"

The non-proliferation regime, which organizes nuclear weapons control to limit the risk of nuclear war and imposes an absolute ban on certain weapons so that our people will forever be protected from the horror of gas or bacteriological warfare, is a relatively recent construction that reached maturity in the 1990s. It is the result of the tragedies of the twentieth century and the firm determination of our predecessors, their vision of the good of humankind and their spirit of responsibility. That edifice is based on the mutual concessions, interdependencies and mutual trust that we built at that time. In a word, it is based on a multilateral approach to security.

Our responsibility, which I strongly believe in today, is that we owe it to those who came before us and to those for whom we are responsible is to preserve and strengthen that regime at a time when it is being seriously tested. The States members of the Council must set an example in that respect, and, in my view, stand united on this issue even more than on others, .

We have been remarkably united on the issue of North Korea, most recently in December 2017 with resolution 2397 (2017). The management of that crisis, as just recalled by the United States President, is now in a new phase thanks to his initiative to engage in a direct dialogue with the Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea. France welcomes and supports his efforts, as well as those made by South Korea, which he highlighted.

At no point should the Security Council lose sight of the fact that North Korea continues to pose a nuclear and ballistic threat to the region and the world. France expects the Pyongyang regime to take concrete actions to demonstrate its genuine willingness to engage in a process of dismantling its nuclear and ballistic programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Until those actions have been taken, the dialogue must be accompanied by rigorous implementation of the sanctions decided by the Council. On that issue, we were united.

We were also united on the issue of Iran with resolution 2231 (2015), but that was in 2015. Since then, the trajectories of the signatory States of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have diverged. And yet, I reiterate, I am convinced that everyone at this table still has the same goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and of guaranteeing, through strict international control, the peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme. The JCPOA is imperfect, but it is a decisive step in that direction.

While a serious crisis of confidence was triggered by the reimposition of extraterritorial sanctions by the United States, Tehran continues to honour its nuclear obligations. That situation must be reinforced by compliance with all the provisions of the JCPOA and the resolution that endorses it, and that applies to all Members of the United Nations — not just France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

We must also go beyond the current framework, as I said that here at the United Nations a year ago (see A/72/PV.4). That is why I share the goals that were recalled by the President of the United States, even if we may disagree on the methods with regard to the JCPOA. I believe that, together, we must build a long-term strategy for managing the crisis, which cannot be reduced to a policy of sanctions and containment. The foundations of new negotiations must be based on, first, the framework for Iran's nuclear power beyond 2025-2030, which is an essential complement to what was attained in 2015; secondly, the issue of Iran's increase in the range and accuracy of its missile arsenal and thus the framework of its ballistic activity; and thirdly, on regional stability. All of those issues can be part of useful international action to reduce the regional dangers and achieving the goal we all seek, namely, that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

We were united on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons with resolution 2118 (2013), but that was in 2013. Since then, threats to the credibility of the prohibition norm have accumulated. The reappearance of chemical weapons during the Syrian regime's offensives, after Damascus had acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and declared its programme, was not met by the necessary resolve by the Council. For its part, Da'esh has used those weapons in Syria and Iraq.

In February 2017, a member of the North Korean ruling family was murdered in Malaysia with the help of a powerful nerve agent, VX. This year, on the territory of the United Kingdom — and thus in the European Union — another nerve agent was used, killing one person and wounding four. France recalls here that it shares the British analysis that there is no plausible explanation other than that Russia is responsible, and it calls on Russia to take all necessary measures to put an end to that threat.

On 23 January 2018, France launched an international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons, which all States are invited to join. It also had to take action against Syrian chemical capabilities, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, and I would like to thank President Trump and Prime Minister May in that regard. France is working to strengthen the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by setting up a new investigative and attribution mechanism, which is essential.

France will work tirelessly to unite the Council on non-proliferation issues. We must remain united because in recent years, whenever we have been divided, it has been at the expense of our principles and our collective effectiveness. It is a condition of our legitimacy as permanent and non-permanent members. We must be united also because the spread of technology carries the seeds of new threats to peace that directly concern us.

The development of intercontinental missiles by North Korea is a matter of concern. Until now, only a few States had those powerful weapons, which placed a particular responsibility on them. In the future, if sufficient control is not ensured by all and if North Korea proliferates, how many countries will have them?

In the Middle East, ballistic assistance to Hizbullah and the Houthis is a new and worrying development. It must stop before those entities destabilize a tense region even further.

The fight against Da'esh has confirmed the interest of terrorist groups in weapons of mass destruction. The threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism has not disappeared despite the leadership shown by the United States in this area with the Nuclear Security Summits. France calls for continued international cooperation, which is more necessary than ever.

France will continue to strictly respect its commitments under the international non-proliferation regime and to strengthen the various institutions that form its framework. In particular, it will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and its experts, and will address the challenges of combating nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic proliferation during its presidency of the Group of Seven in 2019. To that end, I call for unity and a spirit of responsibility because the non-proliferation regime is the backbone of our collective security system. We have built it decade upon decade. It is still young and requires our mobilization, our spirit of responsibility and our unity.

The President: I now invite His Excellency Mr. Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland, to take the floor.

President Duda: The current security situation is not encouraging. Tensions at the global and regional levels threaten the existing international order, including the non-proliferation and arms control regimes. In fact, we have been witnessing their progressive decomposition. They have been regularly challenged by non-State actors, but what is of even greater concern is that they are also being undermined by individual States.

Before I address the problem of nuclear weapons, I would like to first draw attention to another type of weapon of mass destruction that has made its way back to the top of the global agenda. I am referring to chemical weapons. Let me be clear — every use of a chemical weapon is a crime. It does not matter whether it is used on a mass scale by undemocratic regimes against their own people to secure their power or whether it is used in a State-terrorist manner against individuals abroad on whom a certain State wants to take revenge. And if it is a crime, it means that the principal obligation of the international community is defined by the rules-based order. Criminals must be brought to justice.

No single use of chemical weapons can be left unanswered since it not only undermines the basic sense of justice, but also leads to the erosion of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and, in consequence, threatens the security of us all. Brutal attacks, directed mostly against civilians, all have the same aim — to intimidate the international community. The community of the United Nations cannot accept such methods. Our inaction will only encourage perpetrators. I hope that the finalization of the new European Union sanctions mechanism, completed in the framework of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, will allow us to bring appropriate pressure to bear on current and future perpetrators, as well as deter them from those unacceptable actions.

We had all hoped to have chemical weapons effectively banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. We must stand firmly behind our own rules and norms, which are the pillars of the international order. In that context, let me mention that, as in previous years, Poland will introduce to the General Assembly a draft resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is of great importance to preserve the integrity of this regime. Therefore, we call on all Member States to ensure a strong, clear and united message of support of the whole international community for the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the efforts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The second issue I would like to highlight is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Permit me to make three points regarding this matter.

First, we all know that nuclear weapons cannot be bought on the free market. Therefore, every act of proliferation of these weapons is a failure of both the international community and the rules-based world order. And we must remember that it always involves not only the State that develops a nuclear capacity, but also those who provide it with the means to achieve it, namely, technology, materials and resources.

It is of the utmost importance for every agreement that aims to control nuclear programmes to guarantee that such programmes are used solely for peaceful purposes. We have an obligation to evaluate such agreements against their stated purposes and to act accordingly. We should not turn a blind eye to those who contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by providing the

means or assisting in other ways to develop nuclear weapon capacities.

Good and effective export control mechanisms should be upheld by all countries involved in nuclear, chemical and biological trade for peaceful purposes in order to maintain the appropriate control level of dual-use goods and to make non-proliferation efforts more effective. In that regard, we welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to strictly monitor and verify Iran's commitments. Let me also take this opportunity to commend the vital role the Agency plays in non-proliferation. The Agency's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT.

Secondly, I would like to welcome the prospect of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We have seen some encouraging developments, such as the inter-Korean summits and the meeting of Kim Jong Un with President Donald Trump. This led to the stopping of the missile and nuclear tests. I would like to stress, Mr. President, that this is, in great measure, your and President Moon's great achievement and merit, for which I thank you. However, decisive steps have yet to be taken. Lasting peace will not be achieved without the denuclearization of North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Until then, the international community must remain united in maintaining real and consistent pressure on North Korea, including by upholding the United Nations sanctions regime.

Thirdly, for the sake of the credibility of the international community, it is vital to stand firmly behind the duties and obligations we have taken upon our shoulders. In that context, I am saddened by the concerning developments in the security situation in our region of Central and Eastern Europe.

In just the past few years, we have witnessed a clear breach of the Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for its peaceful and voluntary denuclearization. We have also heard about the use of nuclear weapons to end conventional conflicts. Equally alarming was the deployment of a dual-capable means of delivery close to our borders. All these actions have significantly contributed to the deterioration of the security environment.

What should our response to the challenges I have just listed be? It requires, first, the full and firm implementation of the well-established and widely recognized treaties and norms of international law; secondly, support for and full confidence in the work of the international mechanisms responsible for preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction; finally, proactive and constructive engagement in initiatives that aim at fighting proliferation efforts and promoting transparency and verification.

In 2018, my country assumed the chairmanship of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and chaired the seventeenth annual Regular Meeting of the Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Our efforts have been focused on strengthening these regimes, their universalization, securing their widespread and credible verification mechanisms, implementing good practices, and tightening international cooperation. These actions constitute long-term objectives of the Polish security policy.

In conclusion, let me stress once again that non-proliferation is a collective effort. To uphold the security architecture that we have built for decades and to prevent the nightmares of the recurring use of weapons of mass destruction, we need the full commitment of everyone, without any exception, to observing all norms and obligations in this field.

The President: I now invite His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, to take the floor.

President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (*spoke in Spanish*): It is my pleasure and honour to address the Council for the first time on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. We thank the United States of America for convening this debate and congratulate it on its excellent work as President of the Council.

Disarmament is one of the longest-standing objectives of the United Nations. It was the subject of the first Security Council resolution (resolution 1 (1946)), adopted on 25 January 1946, under Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council adopted that resolution 72 years ago, and to this day the world is still in the midst of an arms race that leads many States to feel obliged to equip themselves with all types of weapons for their defence, including weapons of

mass destruction. Moreover, such nuclear arsenals not only aggravate tensions between States and undermine efforts for peace, but also threaten the very existence of humankind. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea neither possesses nor intends to possess weapons of mass destruction; it has adopted measures to guarantee the strict implementation of the commitments and obligations undertaken with the international community in the area of non-proliferation by acceding to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

The promotion of nuclear disarmament must be a priority on the agenda of the international community. Two years from now, we will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970. That international instrument made it possible to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries that did not then possess them, but it was not as successful in eliminating those weapons from the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-armed States, which have always strongly resisted implementing their nuclear disarmament commitments. The expenses incurred by the nuclear Powers to maintain and, in some cases, modernize their arsenals exceed the combined budget of all the countries of the African Union and some other regions.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security and commits the Council to its role of working to prevent the production and spread of such weapons. To counter the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, it is essential to implement and comply with international non-proliferation treaties and resolution 1540 (2004); to support the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; to prohibit all nuclear weapons testing; to share information among States and international organizations; and to implement joint control systems for the verification, inspection and monitoring of nuclear arsenals and research plants by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which should also include their security and destruction. In addition, negotiations with nuclear-weapon States should be encouraged to effectively reject the nuclear weapons option. At the same time, their security should be guaranteed and the right of all parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy recognized.

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is highly alarmed because of the paradox that what the United Nations says and what each country actually does within its sovereign prerogative takes place in a context of lies, deceptions, hypocrisy and a lack of solidarity. Just two days ago we devoted a special summit to the honour the thinking of the South African leader Nelson Mandela, in which we all agreed to reject any kind of confrontation and resentment and that, thanks to his legacy, a world of peace, security, development and well-being for all could be achieved. Nevertheless, many States appear to choose to wage an arms race that runs counter to the noble ideals of the Mandela summit, which all of us accepted and applauded.

Weapons of mass destruction can be banned and their use made unthinkable. All that is required is the necessary will on all sides. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its firm support for pursuing efforts towards the negotiation and adoption of binding legal instruments leading to effective, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. The international community of nations should also be deeply concerned about the humanitarian consequences and global effects of any nuclear detonation, be it accidental or intentional, and must cooperate at the international security level to prevent non-State actors from acquiring the means to engage in nuclear terrorism.

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is committed to the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and under the supervision of the IAEA.

I shall conclude by pointing out that in our region of Africa there are no weapons of mass destruction, nor have they ever been used, which, for us, indicates that weapons of mass destruction are the result of the illegal trafficking of weapons, terrorism and the conflicts on our continent. That is why there is a need to support the African Union in its desire and initiative to obtain funding for peace missions led by Africa on a case-by-case basis. I strongly appeal to the members of the Security Council to ensure that this support materializes, since it will ultimately contribute to international peace and security, which is the main objective of the Security Council.

The President: I now invite His Excellency Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, Constitutional President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to take the floor

President Morales Ayma (*spoke in Spanish*): The presidency of the Security Council has called on its members to discuss the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Bolivia is located in a region that has been declared nuclear-weapon-free for more than half a century. For that reason, I recall article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

> "Each ... State Party undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever ... and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

I call on all States represented around this table to sign, ratify and give immediate effect to these provisions. That is the best way to avoid the catastrophic possibility of the use of such weapons. It is an ethical imperative and a debt to future generations.

The States Members of the United Nations system are obliged to comply with the essential tenets of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in 1945, and above all to resolve their international disputes through the use of mechanisms of peaceful settlement. In no dispute may they use weapons of any kind. Rather, it is negotiation, diplomacy, dialogue and judicial settlement that must guide the actions of the countries. Bolivia is convinced that only through these means will we achieve more just societies with shared responsibilities.

We must be capable of leaving the primitive use of weapons among peoples in the past. I must highlight as an example the contribution of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations system, in the effective resolution of disputes between States in different latitudes and different situations. We are convinced that it is essential to discuss not only the effects, but above all the structural causes of armed conflicts and the real motivations for breaches of international peace, security and justice.

One example of that is Iran, a country that has already been referred to this morning. In 1953, the United States financed, organized and executed a coup d'état against a democratically elected Government that, in exercise of its sovereignty, nationalized its oil from the hands of an Anglo-American company. Then, for several decades, it supported an authoritarian Government that allowed oil profits to benefit transnational corporations.

That was the situation until the 1979 revolution. Now that Iran has regained control of its resources, it is once again a victim of a United States siege. Bolivia categorically rejects the unilateral actions undertaken by the United States Government against Iran. It also condemns the fact that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, using excuses to pursue its policy of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of that sister country.

I would also point to the region of the Middle East, rich in natural resources but disproportionately affected by invasions, wars and situations of unjustified aggression that continue to produce pain and mourning among its peoples. That region has been the scene of the three greatest aggressions committed in the twenty-first century. The first was the illegal invasion of Iraq, based on the lie that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction. That invasion resulted in more than 1 million deaths. The second aggression was the overthrow of the Libyan Government, with tens of thousands of dead, on the pretext of humanitarian motivations. The serious political instability and humanitarian crisis it unleashed in North Africa are ongoing. The third aggression is the civil war in Syria, which over the past eight years has caused more than half a million deaths. That war is the direct product of interference and the financing of the armed groups and terrorist organizations that are confronting the Syrian Government.

In recent months, the United States has once again demonstrated its contempt for international law, multilateralism and the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Every time the United States invades a country, launches missiles or finances regime-change, it does so together with a propaganda campaign that reiterates that such action is in the name of justice, freedom, democracy, human rights or for humanitarian reasons. I would like to inform the Council that the United States is not interested in democracy, for if that were so it would not have financed coups d'état and supported dictators. It would not threaten democratically elected Governments with military interventions, as it has done with Venezuela. It is not interested in human rights or justice. If so, it would sign and ratify international human rights treaties. It would not threaten the investigative mechanisms of the International Criminal Court. It would not encourage the use of torture or withdraw from the Human Rights Council. It would not separate migrant children from

their families or put them in cages. The United States is not interested in multilateralism. If so, it would not have withdrawn from the Paris Agreement or renounced the global compact on migration. It would not launch unilateral attacks or make unilateral decisions, such as illegally declaring Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel. Such contempt for multilateralism is motivated by its desire for geopolitical control and to appropriate natural resources.

Nonetheless, we commend the countries — France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China and Russia — that stand firm in defence of the nuclear agreement signed with Iran; did not abandon the Paris Agreement; defend the principles of the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in internal affairs; respect international law and commitments made and uphold multilateralism. The responsibility of our generation is to bequeath a fairer and safer world to future generations. That will be achieved only if we work together to build a multipolar world, with common rules for respecting and defending the United Nations from all threats.

The President: I now invite His Excellency Mr. Martín Vizcarra Cornejo, President of the Republic of Peru, to take the floor.

President Vizcarra Cornejo (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to greet Mr. Donald Trump, as well as all other dignitaries and senior officials present.

Peru welcomes today's high-level meeting to draw the attention of the world and the Security Council to the need to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as we mark the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Throughout its history, the Council has remained united in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, in keeping with its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, as entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations.

The work of the Council is based on the gradual development of international instruments, which, in turn, are based on a series of binding instruments adopted by the Organization and its Member States. The most recent of those instruments is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017, which we hope all countries, in particular those with nuclear arsenals, will one day be able to join. Indeed, this is not a utopia. Thanks to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin America and the Caribbean is a nuclear-weapon-free region, which has enabled it to make progress in consolidating a region of peace.

As a country committed to non-proliferation regimes, Peru fully complies with the obligations established by the respective instruments, as well as with the provisions of the Council, as stipulated in relevant resolutions. As members of this principal organ, we strongly encourage that they be strictly observed. We believe that ensuring international peace and security means eliminating the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction. There is no better way to do that than to make sure that they do not exist. In that regard, we stress that non-proliferation must go hand in hand with disarmament and strict conventional arms control.

It is our view that that implies, first of all, addressing the challenge posed by the nuclear and ballistic programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that regard, we again commend the high-level diplomacy that you personally, Mr. President, and your Administration have demonstrated in an effort to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We believe that the continued validity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime should also be observed through the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme, endorsed by the Council in resolution 2231 (2015). Furthermore, we must deplore and condemn the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict, as well as in the British city of Salisbury.

In conclusion, given the complex context, we wish to stress the importance of diplomacy, multilateralism, international law, confidence-building measures and universality in strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. We note that, in many cases, it is the perception of insecurity that leads to weapons build-up, and even to the development of new means of warfare. We believe that it is necessary to work on that perception in order to halt proliferation and promote disarmament by investing in international cooperation and development. Technology must serve to promote peace and progress, not dehumanization and destruction.

The President: I now give the floor to the Vice-President of Côte d'Ivoire.

Mr. Kablan Duncan (Côte d'Ivoire) (*spoke in French*): First of all, I would like to thank the

United States presidency of the Security Council for organizing today's high-level debate on the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would also like to welcome you, Mr. President, as well as the other Heads of State and Government and eminent persons present at today's meeting, to discuss an issue of such great importance for our planet.

The rapid development of nuclear and ballistic programmes has led to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons fuel violence and conflict, threaten the stability of entire regions and make the issue of non-proliferation an objective that will ensure the survival of humankind. Despite all efforts made by the international community to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, regrettably, our world remains under the constant threat of such weapons and of biological and chemical weapons. At the moment, there are more than 14,500 nuclear weapons in the world. They pose the risk of a nuclear conflict with irreversible humanitarian and environmental consequences and represent a real challenge for the Organization.

It is also regrettable that States are inclined to invest more in the modernization of their nuclear arsenals but very little in the elimination of such weapons and their means of delivery. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, considered to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, has been sorely tested and is the source of major discord at its Review Conferences, held every five years. Non-compliance by certain States in upholding their commitments regarding disarmament and non-proliferation constitutes a serious blow to security and could lead to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

The Iranian nuclear problem, the situation in the Middle East — including Syria and allegations of the use of chemical weapons in that country and the use of ballistic missiles in Yemen — and the issue of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula constitute truly complex situations and real sources of concern for the international community. Those situations urgently compel us to place the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the top of our list of priorities. In facing that situation, the Security Council, as the guarantor of the maintenance of international peace and security, must continue to shoulder its responsibilities in the area of non-proliferation.

In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire calls for the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as the implementation of the various international legal instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation. To that end, my country calls on Member States, supported by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to meet their international obligations in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Accordingly, Côte d'Ivoire, which is party to all major non-proliferation treaties and conventions, has incorporated all obligations under those international legal instruments into its national laws. With regard to disarmament, as the step-by-step approach has not produced the desired results, the delegation of Côte d'Ivoire calls on the nuclear-weapon States to consider a new and more effective approach.

Côte d'Ivoire welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017 and stresses the importance of its swift implementation. Outer space, rightly considered as a common good for humankind, deserves our sustained attention and requires the urgent adoption of an international and legally binding instrument to protect it from any arms race and thereby avoid its militarization. Moreover, Côte d'Ivoire stresses the need for the international community to adopt a more binding instrument in the area of biological and toxin weapons. Similarly, my country would like to see the adoption a universal and non-discriminatory instrument so as to ensure security for non-nuclear-weapon States. With regard to chemical weapons, Côte d'Ivoire calls for the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016). In that regard, the mandate accorded to the OPCW at the special session held at The Hague on 26 and 27 June to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of chemical-weapon attacks could greatly contribute to resolving the issue relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Côte d'Ivoire calls on the Security Council to stand united on that important issue.

Concerning the Iranian nuclear issue, the Ivoiran delegation supports the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is satisfactory in general. In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire calls on stakeholders to settle their differences concerning the agreement, which was the result of unprecedented international compromise and remains to this day a genuine assurance for the implementation of the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and a pledge to ensure peace and regional stability.

Regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes recent positive developments. The historic 12 June meeting in Singapore between you, Mr. President, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains one of the major milestones of the new regional dynamic. In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its commitment to the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultations. We urge all stakeholders to rule out definitively all military options, which could lead only to damaging and irreversible consequences for the entire planet.

In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms its commitment to multilateralism and international law, and stresses the need for according high priority to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime on chemical weapons, including their means of delivery, as well as promoting disarmament and arms control.

The President: I now invite The Right Honourable Mrs. Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to take the floor.

Mrs. May (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this important debate. There is no greater threat to international peace and security than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These issues matter to every man, woman and child around the globe, and United Kingdom, like the other permanent members of the Security Council, has a special responsibility to protect the significant gains that we have made in the past 70 years — because the international community has invested a huge amount of energy into containing the horrific forces that emerged in the twentieth century. The multilateral framework of treaties to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest achievements of the international community, thereby demonstrating the value of global cooperation. It has improved all of our security. It has brought about a measure of predictability and stability. And it has paved the way to arms control agreements and disarmament.

When many of us around this table were born, it was feared that dozens of nuclear-weapon States might emerge. Instead, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has seen a remarkable near-30 States abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Global stockpiles have been reduced by almost 80 per cent since their Cold war peak. That is true success on a truly global scale. Similar if not greater success has been achieved with regard to chemical and biological weapons. More than 96 per cent of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been destroyed under international verification, and no country professes publicly to possess biological weapons. But the past 18 months have seen those hard-won gains challenged. We have seen chemical weapons used in Syria, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. The conventions governing our nuclear compact are being picked at. Predictability and stability are declining. If we do not increase our collective efforts to preserve and build on what we have, there is a very real risk that those gains will subside or fall away.

The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty is rightly perceived as the flagship of the international community's determination against nuclear proliferation. Supporting it requires leadership, which your Administration and you personally, Mr. President, are demonstrating with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — the world's most pressing nuclear threat. In meeting Kim Jong Un, you have created a historic opportunity for complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Consensus from the Council to impose sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea played no small part, but we will not continue meaningful progress towards peace on the Korean peninsula without sustained pressure. Sanctions must be strictly enforced by all, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's neighbours. We must remain vigilant.

Ensuring non-proliferation also requires collective leadership of the type that led to the 2015 agreement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal. For many years, the scale and nature of Iran's nuclear programme raised serious international concerns. The JCPOA was an important step forward in addressing them. It remains the best means of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and we are committed to preserving the JCPOA, as long as Iran continues to abide by its obligations in full. Iran must ensure that it implements its obligations fully, and, in order to monitor Iran's compliance, we strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency using inspections and other monitoring provisions of the JCPOA to their full extent.

Other aspects of Iran's policies, in particular its destabilizing regional behaviour and sustained efforts

to enhance its ballistic-missile capability, continue to cause serious concerns. The international community and, where appropriate, the Security Council need to be ready to address that. Iran's proliferation and transfer of missile and sophisticated military technology to groups like Hizbullah in Lebanon or — as the United Nations Panel of Experts concluded — to the Houthis Yemen are also not in compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. It risks a dangerous escalation. We therefore need to see further decisive action in the Council to tackle both the transit and proliferation of those technologies and increase the costs for those responsible. It is regrettable that Russia continues to prevent the Council from upholding its responsibility to stop that destabilizing activity.

Nowhere are the grim consequences of the erosion of global norms on weapons of mass destruction more apparent than in Syria, where the United Nations has concluded that Al-Assad's regime has repeatedly use chemical weapons, a direct assault on a near century-old ban vital to our collective peace and security. Yet Russia has repeatedly wielded its veto to prevent the Security Council from holding the Al-Assad regime to account, even shutting down the international body established to investigate the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

I therefore welcome the decision of 150 countries in June, the largest gathering in its history, to empower the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to attribute responsibility for chemical-weapon attacks in Syria and to put in place arrangements for attribution for any country that requests it. I would like to thank President Trump and President Macron for their shared determination, with the United Kingdom, to deter the use of chemical weapons in Syria through the joint military action in April by the United States, United Kingdom and France. Those actions sent a clear message to the Al-Assad regime, that is, that perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons cannot escape identification or act with impunity. The regime's backers must use their influence to ensure chemical weapons are not used again — for there must be no doubt that we will respond swiftly and appropriately if they are.

The United Kingdom saw the consequences of those norms being eroded in Salisbury this year when Russia recklessly deployed a nerve agent on the streets. The United Kingdom has presented detailed evidence, clearly laid out in charges of attempted murder and the use and possession of a chemical weapon against two agents of the Russian State. We have taken appropriate action with our allies, and we will continue to take the necessary steps to ensure our collective security. Russia has sought only to obfuscate through desperate fabrication. Permanent Members of the Security Council must not attack and undermine the international non-proliferation regimes and the institutions that underpin them. All members of the council must fulfil their responsibilities to safeguard them in support of international peace and security. It is my sincere hope that Russia will rejoin the international consensus against the use of chemical weapons and the collective efforts to uphold it. If so, the Council will again be able to work together to rid the world of chemical weapons, but if not, we should leave no one in any doubt of the international community's determination to uphold international non-proliferation regimes.

Not all the challenges faced by the counter-proliferation framework come before the Council, but they are no less urgent. We need to strengthen the rules to keep pace with new technologies and more complex global supply chains. We must hold every United Nations Member to develop its capabilities and regulations and ensure they are able to make their contribution to that global effort. The quiet, but essential, role the United Nations plays must be at the heart of those efforts. As United Nations Members, therefore, we should invest the expertise and necessary diplomatic resources in the conventions.

It was collective engagement by States across the globe that produced the counter-proliferation framework. Even the most powerful recognized that investing in collective rules-based restraint was the only effective way of addressing national security interests and avoiding unilateral recourse to force. We cannot let that framework be undermined today by those who reject the values and disregard the rules that have kept us safe. It will take collective engagement to reinforce it in the face of today's challenges. And in that, as always been the case, the United Kingdom will play a leading role.

The President: I now give the floor to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands.

Mr. Rutte (Netherlands): There have been several occasions this year when weapons of mass destruction have endangered our security, undermined international stability and caused terrible suffering. The year 2018 has made the importance of non-proliferation

abundantly clear. I agree with you, Mr. President, that, as politicians, we are first and foremost responsible for keeping our own citizens safe, and I believe that multilateral institutions play a major role where the issue is concerned.

As I will say in my address to the General Assembly later today, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has always championed and will continue to champion the rules-based international order and multilateral cooperation, especially homeland security matters and other issues of shared concern. Multilateral cooperation requires active support from all of us, including and even especially on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. We should acknowledge the significant achievements that have been made in controlling those weapons.

For 50 years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has kept the number of nuclear weapon possessors under 10. We can only imagine how much conflict, instability and violence that has prevented. I am encouraged that United States, Russian and British Foreign Ministers have underlined their continuing support for, and commitment to, the NPT on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary.

We have seen some positive steps on non-proliferation this year in relation to North Korea. The ultimate goal of our joint efforts is to ensure that North Korea abandons its nuclear ballistic missile capabilities and its programmes on weapons of mass destruction. It should do that in a comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible manner. We welcome the efforts you, Mr. President, are personally making to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula. For we know that the problem can only be resolved peacefully. As Chair of the sanctions committee, the Netherlands is doing everything it can to ensure that all nations fully implement the sanctions so as to keep up the pressure on North Korea to comply with its international obligations.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), remains a good example of how the Council and the international community can work hand in hand for non-proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency has concluded, in 12 consecutive reports, that Iran is abiding by its commitments under the deal. As long as that continues, we will also uphold our commitment to the deal. At the same time, we are concerned about Iran's role in the region — its ballistic missile programme and human rights record. In particular, Iran's support for Hizbullah, the role Iran plays in Syria and Iraq and in the development of missiles by the Houthis in Yemen remain serious concerns for the Netherlands that need to be addressed.

The repeated use of chemical weapons is deeply alarming. It causes terrible human suffering and erodes the established international norm. There should be no impunity for any use of chemical weapons — not for the large-scale attacks in Syria or for the individual attacks in Malaysia and the United Kingdom. The same goes for the possible use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in Idlib.

All of us, both within and outside the Council, bear a responsibility, because of the stalemate in this organ, we have tasked the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to investigate and identify those responsible for the use of those weapons. We cannot sit back, we have to speak up, take action and firmly support the OPCW so that the perpetrators can be brought to justice, and we need to do it together. Indecisiveness by countries that claim to support the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation could ultimately have disastrous consequences. And with regard to the Salisbury attack, we reaffirm our confidence in the United Kingdom's investigations. We welcome it bringing criminal charges as an important step towards justice, which bolsters our earlier conclusion that it is essential to hold those responsible to account.

In conclusion, the devastating consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction serve to underline the urgent need to take action. The use of those weapons must never become the new normal. We must prevent impunity at all costs. A legal norm can be effective only if we collectively uphold it together as part of a multilateral effort.

The President: I now give the floor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait.

Sheikh Al Sabah (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to express our satisfaction and pleasure at seeing His Excellency President Trump preside over this meeting of the Security Council. We appreciate your initiative in convening this open meeting, which confirms that you attach the utmost priority to one of the most serious threats to

international peace and security, namely, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

The discussion we are having in this Chamber comes at a delicate stage amidst complex circumstances facing our world today. That is especially so in the Middle East region. In addition to the spread of conflicts and terrorism, we are facing more threats embodied in the use of WMDs. Those are not virtual threats any longer, because we have recently witnessed the launch of ballistic missiles, the testing of nuclear weapons and the use of chemical weapons in many places around the world.

In that regard, I would like to reiterate the constant and principled position of the State of Kuwait on non-proliferation. We condemn the use of all WMDs anywhere, at any time and by any party. The use of WMDs is a grave violation of international law. Achieving peace, security and stability in the world cannot be reached while such weapons exist.

We have recently witnessed the horrors of chemical-weapon attacks undertaken by State and non-State actors in Syria. Such attacks confirm that the threat of proliferation of WMDs has not declined, despite numerous treaties and resolutions criminalizing their use. We are following with great concern the possibility once again of such attacks in future, whether in Syria or elsewhere in the world. We emphasize the importance of addressing chemical attacks through the unity of the Security Council in responding to the imminent danger posed by WMDs, thereby ensuring the implementation of the relevant international resolutions, particularly resolution 1540 (2004).

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing unprecedented attacks from ballistic missiles launched by the Houthi militias towards its territories and targeting civilian and religious sites. The State of Kuwait reiterates its strong condemnation and denunciation of the rocket attacks targeting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, and the region in general. We also emphasize the need for the Security Council to take action and shoulder its responsibilities in confronting the threat facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in order to preserve international peace and security. My country's delegation is fully prepared to take further measures in order to put an end to such attacks, which are undoubtedly linked to the proliferation of WMDs.

In the midst of the events the Middle East region is witnessing, the State of Kuwait remains committed to supporting all United Nations resolutions, and we have welcomed the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). While the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to implement the provisions of that resolution and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes reports confirming Iran's compliance with its nuclear-related obligations, we note with concern the independent international reports that indicate that Iran continues to support and finance militias and armed groups in Arab countries.

We are particularly concerned about Iran's interference in Yemen and, as the resolution adopted by the League of Arab States on 11 September confirms, Yemeni territories have been transformed into a launching pad for Iranian-made ballistic missiles targeting Yemen's neighbors and threatening maritime navigation in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, which not only negatively impacts the security and stability of Yemen and the region but also constitutes a violation of resolution 2216 (2015). The League of Arab States resolution also calls on Iran to cease those acts and all such acts that adversely affect the security and best interests of the States in the region, and to undertake confidence-building measures with its neighbors in order to establish ties based on a good neighbour policy, cooperation, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

As I give my speech from this forum, I consider it a great honor to speak as a representative of the Arab States in the Security Council, conveying the concerns and preoccupations of our peace-loving peoples and their aspirations to security and stability. In that context, the State of Kuwait and all other Arab States reaffirm their absolute faith in multilateral action under the umbrella of the United Nations, according to the objectives, principles and commitments agreed upon in the Charter of the United Nations. We also emphasize the Arab position on the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was extended indefinitely after the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East.

We reiterate the Arab position calling upon the three sponsor States of the 1995 Middle East resolution to shoulder their responsibilities by implementing the resolution, as it was an integral part of the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We also emphasize the need for Israel to accede to the

Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the supervision and monitoring of the IAEA, especially as it is the only country in the Middle East that has not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In conclusion, the commitment you have shown, Mr. President, to confront the challenges posed by WMDs is not limited to our meeting here today; it is also to be seen in the current diplomatic efforts to ease tension and achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Those efforts came within the context of cohesion and unity on the part of Security Council members to counter the illegal programmes and activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We know that the road ahead is still long and hard to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, yet we believe that the absolute and sincere commitment of all the parties concerned, as well as the full implementation of all the relevant Security Council resolutions, will lead to a lasting and comprehensive peace agreement in a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China.

Mr. Wang Yi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Maintaining global peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council, as entrusted to it by the Charter of the United Nations, as well as a shared responsibility of all Security Council members. Given the complex challenges to international peace and security, how should the Security Council fulfil that mission and play its role? That is a question that deserves serious consideration. China believes the following.

The Security Council should perform its functions in a fair and just manner, as mandated by the Charter. The Council must uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter, universally recognized international law and the norms governing international relations. It should safeguard the authority and the role of the United Nations in international affairs, as well as the sovereignty, independence and legitimate rights and interests of all countries. The Security Council should adhere to political settlement as the basic direction. The Security Council should also be the strongest advocate for political solutions, resolving differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation. It should make effective use of all the tools at its disposal, including good offices, mediation and peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and step up its preventive diplomacy efforts with the aim of serving the greater goal of achieving political settlements.

The Security Council should enhance its unity in order to promote consensus. All of its members must keep firmly in mind their responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. They should improve their unity and coordination, set aside individual geopolitical considerations, ensure that the Council can function effectively and uphold the common interests of all the States Members of the United Nations. The Council should strengthen its overall planning and coordination with a view to forging synergies, coordinating and cooperating with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General and the United Nations development system so that the political and development pillars can support each other and so that efforts aimed at achieving lasting peace and sustainable development can be mutually reinforcing.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery poses a real threat to global peace and security and is a challenge that we all face. China proposes that we intensify our efforts in three areas. First, we must champion the rule of law in order to consolidate and improve the international non-proliferation regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other relevant Council resolutions together constitute the legal foundation of the international non-proliferation regime. We must all work diligently to safeguard its universality, effectiveness and authority, particularly by preventing terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring WMD materials and technologies.

Secondly, we must take multi-pronged measures to implement the NPT in a balanced way. Every country should keep its word, fulfil its responsibilities and abide by its international obligations. The NPT and related agreements must be fully and comprehensively implemented in their entirety. Double standards, discriminatory arrangements and selective enforcement are impermissible.

Thirdly, we should improve international cooperation and enhance every country's non-proliferation capabilities. It is Governments that

bear the primary responsibility for non-proliferation, and countries should be supported in their efforts to develop their non-proliferation policies based on their national circumstances and encouraged to improve their non-proliferation and law-enforcement capacity-building, and conduct more exchanges and practical cooperation efforts so that together we can strengthen the weakest links and achieve general security.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue represents a hard-won achievement for multilateralism that reinforces the international nuclear-non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the Middle East generally. While no international agreement is perfect, the JCPOA has had the unanimous endorsement of the Security Council. The events of the past three years have shown that it is a viable agreement, and China encourages Iran to continue to fulfil all of its commitments. At the same time, the legitimate right of all countries to conduct normal economic relations and trade with Iran should be respected. China calls on the relevant parties to keep the big picture in mind, think long-term and uphold the sanctity, integrity and efficacy of the JCPOA.

Since the beginning of the year, there has been major progress with the situation on the Korean peninsula. China has been working relentlessly to that end, and we support the important understandings reached between the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States at the Singapore summit. We also support the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to improve their relations. We call on all the parties to take advantage of the current opportunities to translate this political consensus into concrete action, and to work on establishing a peace mechanism and, ultimately, denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, with a view to achieving a lasting peace there as soon as possible.

China lives by its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to upholding the current international system centred on the United Nations. We have worked diligently to fulfil our international responsibilities and obligations. We must continue to work together to realize peace and security for all.

In conclusion, I want to point out that China has never wavered in respecting the principle of non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs. It is a tradition of Chinese foreign policy, and our observance of it has been commended by the international community. We have never interfered, and never will interfere, in any country's domestic affairs. We reject any unwarranted accusations to that effect and call on others to abide by the purposes of the Charter and to refrain from interfering in other countries' internal affairs.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): In the modern world, the ability to effectively combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is particularly crucial to the maintenance of global and regional stability and to reliably ensuring the security of every State, without exception. Constructive cooperation in this area is an important element of our efforts to establish a positive international agenda.

I think we all agree that the Security Council resolutions that set out concrete measures for dealing with those who violate non-proliferation regimes should be strictly observed. The cornerstone remains the founding resolution 1540 (2004), which requires Member States to commit to taking concrete measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their components from falling into the hands of non-State actors. The Council's resolutions, providing for sanctions for the transfer of any type of arms to terrorists, are especially important. Such transfers do happen and must be thoroughly investigated.

Just as it was 50 years ago, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature, my country remains committed to the goal of ridding the world of the nuclear threat. At the same time, there can be no question that we have to consider every factor influencing strategic stability, and that every country with military and nuclear potential should take part in the negotiation process. The desire of a number of countries to ban nuclear weapons in isolation from the fundamental principles of the NPT has no hope of success and serves only to create ambiguity with regard to future approaches to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking of the NPT, I should not omit to mention resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to settle the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from this agreement represents a serious threat to the non-proliferation regime, particularly since, as many

speakers before me have emphasized, Tehran has been meticulously abiding by its obligations under the JCPOA, as the International Atomic Energy Agency has regularly confirmed. Russia is a firm believer in the importance of preserving the JCPOA, and we are actively working on that at the moment with Iran, China and the European Union. Without it, we could be facing increasing tensions throughout the Middle East, fraught with risks to regional stability and the non-proliferation regime. The collapse of the JCPOA would also be extremely counterproductive for the ongoing efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, which we welcome and support.

There continue to be other serious obstacles to nuclear non-proliferation — essentially, the decision of the United States to put off for an unspecified period, perhaps forever, its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the lack of progress in implementing the decision of the States parties to the NPT on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

The situation regarding chemical-weapon disarmament is also worrying, primarily in connection with the actions of a number of Western States, which have continued again and again to accuse the Syrian authorities of the use of banned chemical agents. We should warn them against carrying out any new attacks on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic under any more staged pretexts, which would constitute a gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and undermine the efforts to promote a political settlement in that long-suffering country. The Government of Syria has destroyed its arsenal of chemical weapons in accordance with the Russian-American agreement of 2013, enshrined in Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and in the resolutions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. But there are terrorist groups that do possess chemical warfare materials. They have learned how to synthesize them and have built their own laboratories for that. Intelligence services, including those of the United States, have been issuing warnings about this for a long time. Russia has repeatedly proposed developing a comprehensive strategy for combating chemical terrorism. In 2017 Russian and China introduced a draft resolution on the subject to the Security Council that was not considered, through no fault of ours. From a broader perspective, as long ago as March 2016, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we submitted a draft convention at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on combating acts of chemical and biological terrorism. Sadly, work on it has been artificially blocked, and no doubt we all know by which countries. Nevertheless, our proposals still stand.

Meanwhile, the situation is deteriorating in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, where our Western colleagues are trying to impose so-called attributive functions on its Technical Secretariat, in a gross violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention that infringes on the prerogatives of the Security Council.

At the same time, entirely unsubstantiated rhetoric, in the "highly likely" vein, is increasing in connection with the Salisbury affair. However, Britain has been stubbornly rejecting our repeated proposals for a joint investigation, despite the fact that this is a requirement according to its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the 1965 bilateral Consular Convention and the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. This raises the possibility that if they do not want to cooperate, they have something to hide. We once again call on London to launch a constructive dialogue in order to establish the truth.

The way events have been developing gives reason to believe that today no possibility can be excluded, including that of provocations involving the use of biological weapons. Given the attempts I have mentioned to manipulate the status of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I want to caution against the temptation to do the same with the Biological Weapons Convention. I would like to point out that the Convention stipulates that the right to initiate and conduct investigations belongs to the Security Council alone. There is no provision for surrogates, nor can there be. Incidentally, I would like to remind the Council that we more than once proposed to agree on a mechanism for verifying the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. However, that was firmly blocked and ultimately completely buried by the United States. Washington's desire to preserve a free hand has also been apparent when the Convention's regime has encountered additional issues with regard to the spread of military medical and biological activity, including in the post-Soviet space. We urge everyone to reject the militarization of health care. Russia has consistently advocated for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, and we are implementing several

initiatives to that end, including the establishment of mobile anti-epidemic teams for rapid responses to biological emergencies.

A dialogue between Russia and the United States, as the two largest nuclear Powers, is especially important for strengthening the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction. Our two States were present at the creation of the common frameworks for multilateral cooperation in preventing such weapons from falling into the hands of non-State actors and combating acts of nuclear terrorism. Russia still considers such cooperation to be fundamentally important, not just for Moscow and Washington but for the entire international community. Let us not sacrifice it for the sake of instant decisions and short-term calculations. Based on the solid foundation of the Charter of the United Nations, Russia is always open to honest cooperation with the five major nuclear-weapon States and all other countries in the interests of strengthening global strategic stability. We hope that today's meeting of the Security Council — the key organ for the maintenance of international peace and security — will enable us to take a step in that direction. In that regard, we believe that President Trump's initiative to convene this meeting is very timely.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.

Mr. Negewo (Ethiopia): We thank the United States presidency for convening today's high-level briefing on non-proliferation. We are very pleased to see you presiding over this important meeting, Mr. President. Non-proliferation has indeed been high on the Council's agenda and it is therefore timely and relevant that we are discussing the issue at the highest level.

A few days ago, the world paid tribute to the late Kofi Annan. In a speech he gave in 2006 he said,

> "Can there be any threat more alarming, in today's world, than that of a nuclear or biological weapon falling into the hands of terrorists, or being used by a State as a result of some terrible misunderstanding or miscalculation? The more States have such weapons, the greater the risk. And the more those States that already have them increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to their national security, the more other States feel that they too must have them, for their security."

This is indeed the reality that we are facing today. Indeed, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is posing grave threats to global peace and security. From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iranian nuclear issues to chemical attacks in Syria and the Salisbury incident in the United Kingdom, proliferation risks have become one of the most serious challenges of our time. The international non-proliferation regime is under serious strain and global anxieties about nuclear weapons are at the highest level since the end of the Cold War, as Secretary-General António Guterres said.

We believe it is absolutely vital that we comprehensively address the risks of proliferation. We have no option but to strive to find negotiated solutions through political and diplomatic means to some of the most difficult issues that we are currently facing. We have all been observing the developments following the recent summit meeting between you, Mr. President, and Mr. Kim Jong Un, the outcome of which has given us some sense of hope for progress towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the advancement of peace in North-East Asia. We encourage such endeavours, as we have first-hand experience in resolving and bringing peace through diplomatic means to the no-war, no-peace situation that existed for 20 years between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

We earnestly hope that you will maintain the momentum generated recently with a view to finding a comprehensive, peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council should continue to support such endeavours. In that regard, the talk of a follow-up summit is indeed encouraging. We also welcome the outcome of the third inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and hope it will lay a foundation for concrete action towards sustainable peace, security and complete and verifiable denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council should support the relevant parties in making progress in that direction. In the meantime, we believe that the continued implementation of the sanctions regime will be critical.

With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, we remain convinced that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) represents a significant achievement for multilateralism. However, we understand the challenges and difficulties inherent in the broader implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). While we recognize that

the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA represents a serious challenge, the commitment of the remaining participating countries will be critical to its full implementation. We hope they will continue to make every possible effort to address the major challenges and to contribute to the full implementation of the agreement, which remains vital to the global non-proliferation architecture.

In addressing the proliferation risk posed by non-State actors, we believe that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continues to play a significant role. Strengthening the Committee's assistance framework for Member States aimed at addressing gaps in implementation continues to be important in comprehensively addressing the proliferation risk posed by non-State actors, including terrorists. The Council should also pay particular attention to strengthening the collaboration between the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee and members of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.

Finally, multilateral agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons continue to make an immense contribution to the prevention and elimination of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At a time of great risks of proliferation, it is in all of our best interests to preserve those important multilateral agreements in order to guarantee our collective safety and security and ensure their full and effective implementation.

I would therefore like to conclude by reaffirming Ethiopia's unwavering commitment to continuing to fulfil its international obligations by taking all the necessary measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of State and non-State actors, including terrorists, as well as by fully implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions in that regard.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Mr. Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan): We are grateful to the United States presidency for organizing today's summit meeting of world leaders focused on countering the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Given that previous speakers have mentioned the devastating consequences of the use and testing of weapons of mass destruction, I want the Council and the world to understand that Kazakhstan, along with some other nations and vast territories, has been suffering those consequences since the early days of the Cold War.

The goal of today's meeting is very close to Kazakhstan's heart and is one of the key priorities of my country's foreign policy. Kazakhstan's firm and unwavering commitment to international peace and security began at our independence in 1991. Our Head of State, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, took the daring and bold decision to renounce our nuclear arsenal and close the Semipalatinsk nuclear-weapon test site, the world's fourth and second largest, respectively. The international community acknowledged the unprecedented and laudable nature of those actions by establishing 29 August, the date of the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site, as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. In September, the United Nations community commemorated that Day in a new, official high-level format, in which the international community reiterated its plea for more effective steps to rebuild trust between nuclear and non-nuclear countries.

Earlier this year, in January, the signature event of Kazakhstan's presidency of the Security Council was devoted to the importance of confidence-building measures in achieving the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (see S/PV.8160). Confidence-building measures succeeded in stopping the arms race and preventing a nuclear catastrophe in the past century. Today, the world is hoping for a repeat of the same visionary actions from the nuclear Powers, something that is unfortunately not being fully realized or acknowledged at today's meeting.

At the Security Council meeting in January, as well as in his manifesto "The World. The Twenty-First Century", President Nazarbayev noted that the largest nuclear Powers should be in the vanguard in advocating for a nuclear-weapon-free world and should lead by example in reducing their weapons of mass destruction. Past conflicts have shown that we cannot ensure our own security by undermining the security of others. President Nazarbayev has therefore urged all of us to understand that only complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and full disarmament can be an absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. He has therefore called on all States Members of the United Nations to build a nuclear-weapon-free

world by 2045, the centenary of the founding of the United Nations.

We have seen some good examples of confidence-building measures in the case of the inter-Korean rapprochement and the Singapore summit, due in part to the successful personal efforts of President Trump, which have the potential to inspire other positive outcomes of goodwill and sincere collaboration. Kazakhstan fully supports such promising beginnings and is ready to share its practical experience and expertise, if necessary, based on our sad legacy, as I have mentioned. However, trust alone cannot guarantee sustained success unless it is supported by the strict implementation of all existing regulatory legal instruments and the Security Council's sanctions resolutions. Without diminishing the role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is clear that the world needs a stronger international legal framework against WMDs. The current asymmetric implementation of the Treaty is an obstacle to trust between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Nevertheless, the NPT should not lose its effectiveness and relevance amid such scepticism.

The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should also become one of the most important and essential building blocks for the global non-proliferation architecture. When fully operational, it will definitely help to foster mutual trust and confidence. Kazakhstan cooperates actively with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and annually conducts high-level international events aimed at implementing effective practical steps to achieve a world without nuclear threats, as a natural outcome of our commitments. To realize that goal, we must first and foremost establish a final ban on nuclear testing. Secondly, Atoms for Peace should remain our important moral compass. However, in the meantime, we should not cease our struggle to achieve a legal ban on nuclear weapons, keeping in mind our paramount goal of attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world.

By opening the International Atomic Energy Agency Low-Enriched Uranium Bank last year, Kazakhstan made another contribution towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime and ensuring the safe and reliable use of uranium for peaceful purposes. We are grateful to all donors — the United States, the European Union, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Norway and the Nuclear Threat Initiative — whose generous financial contributions made the project possible. We also thank China and Russia for their cooperation regarding the transit through their territories of low-enriched uranium and equipment for the Bank.

How can we enforce non-proliferation and disarmament through the measures of the Security Council? First, the Council must maintain its unity and common understanding in order to send the world a clear and unambiguous message about our strong stance on those issues. It is vital to ensure that everyone realizes that sanctions are interim measures and not an end in themselves. Their effectiveness should be measured by the degree of progress towards reaching political solutions peacefully.My President has also suggested that withdrawing from the NPT should be made extremely difficult, possibly by crafting a special Security Council resolution with serious implications for countries in breach of the Treaty. He has also proposed developing a legally binding system of guarantees to be given by nuclear Powers to States willing to voluntarily renounce their nuclear weapons, as well as those with non-nuclear status, as an incentive for the latter not to acquire such weapons. That is a fair step that can be undertaken without significant costs.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to be an effective way of combating the spread of nuclear weapons. My President has therefore proposed strengthening the cooperation between nuclear-weapon-free zones by organizing a high-level inter-zone meeting in Astana next year. The permanent five members should encourage the expansion of those zones by providing them with security guarantees. We therefore hope that Central Asia's nuclear-weapon-free zone will be endorsed by the last hold-out among the permanent five.

Given the criticism of the considerably weakened non-proliferation regime in Syria, Kazakhstan is firmly convinced that the Council has to be united in working tirelessly to find a comprehensive solution to the issues of arbitration and prosecution, without transferring such prerogatives to other structures and subjecting them to further polarization and politicization. A political settlement of the Syrian conflict will also help eliminate the vacuum that allows chemical weapons to be used with impunity. For its part, Kazakhstan will continue to provide the Astana platform of ceasefire and confidence-building measures as a complement and support to the Geneva process, under the leadership of the United Nations.

Regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that multilateral document has fulfilled its primary mission by putting Iran on a nuclear-free path, with the IAEA confirming that Iran has fulfilled all its nuclear obligations. Kazakhstan, with its reputation as an honest broker, hosted two sets of talks during the negotiations that led up to the agreement. As the world's top uranium exporter, Kazakhstan contributed significantly by supplying 60 tons of raw uranium to Iran in exchange for Tehran sending over 300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia. All the parties to the agreement have acknowledged this measure as a significant milestone, with this action constituting the first start of JCPOA implementation. Notwithstanding certain complications related to the obligations of some parties to the agreement, we hope for its further implementation. We propose that new concerns and challenges be considered through all possible means of diplomacy, without destroying our hard-won achievements.

Finally, it is necessary for all in the Council to demonstrate responsibility, political will and wisdom in order to make a quantum leap forward of great historical significance. We need the moral compass to go from narrow national interests to a greater vision of a safe and secure world.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden.

Ms. Wallström (Sweden): Listening to the representatives of all countries around this table, I have heard support for the idea that multilateral and diplomatic efforts are urgently needed to address the challenges of today. International peace and security, and preventing conflict and terrorism, are rightly high on our agenda. I therefore thank you, Madam President, for convening this important meeting on non-proliferation.

We have been asked to comment on four themes in this briefing: sanctions efficiency, capacity to implement, non-State actors, and weapons of mass destruction. I think that the answer to all of issues is close multilateral cooperation. The world would certainly be a much more dangerous place without the existing treaties and agreements of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Yet, that multilateral framework depends on our continuous commitment to collective solutions.

In many parts of the world, we are seeing the modernization of nuclear weapons arsenals, increased missile capacities, the threat of chemical weapons use and a normalization of the rhetoric surrounding all weapons of mass destruction. History has shown us too many times that such steps form a pathway to catastrophe. The nuclear-weapon States bear a particular responsibility in upholding and making good on the commitment inherent in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of a nuclear weapons-free world. To that end, the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 2020 must pave the way for enhanced disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. Equally, Sweden reiterates the call on all States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the common tool towards disarmament and non-proliferation, but let me today also focus on three specific issues on which many speakers have already touched. These are the challenges to the Iran nuclear agreement, the development of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the recurring use of chemical weapons.

First, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran deal — is a historic achievement. It is a concrete example of effective diplomatic non-proliferation efforts. The agreement prevents nuclear proliferation in Iran, but also aims to avoid ripple effects in the region. As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms, Iran continues to fulfil its nuclear obligations under the agreement. As long as that is the case, the JCPOA effectively curtails Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons.

This is why Sweden, together with the rest of the European Union (EU), deeply regrets the United States unilateral withdrawal from the agreement — a decision with far-reaching consequences that makes our world more unsafe. And frankly, what are the alternatives to the agreement? Undercutting a concrete multilateral non-proliferation tool it dangerously undermines our joint non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.

Together with our EU partners, we will try to mitigate the adverse effects of the United States policies. Sweden and the rest of the EU will continue to foster broad relations and dialogue with Iran, including on issues such as human rights. Iran's role in the region and missile activities are clearly a matter of concern. These concerns can and should, however, be addressed

separately and not at the expense of the JCPOA. Security in the Middle East region can be achieved only through diplomatic solutions and enhanced cooperation, not through further polarization and isolation. It should be remembered that we tried that before for decades, with isolation and sanctions, and all it did was to support the most conservative forces in Iran. That is a problem

Secondly, the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a major threat to the global non-proliferation regime. Recent diplomatic efforts deserve our full and active support. The continued progress in the inter-Korean dialogue is very encouraging, and the summit between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Singapore in June was indeed significant. All parties must now work to maintain momentum and take positive steps. For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that means that commitments must be translated into legally binding undertakings. The IAEA should be given a role early in the verification of the denuclearization and disarmament process. The Security Council and the international community must continue to stand united.

Thirdly, the use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law. Every violation undermines established norms and risks eroding the international taboo on these weapons. This is a very serious and worrisome development. The use of chemical weapons is morally abhorrent and can never be accepted.

In Syria, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has confirmed that chemical weapons were used repeatedly by the Syrian Arab Republic and by Da'esh. We supported the decision to task the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. While a mechanism established by the Council would have been preferable, the issue was too important to be allowed to be blocked. This does not, however, free the Council from its responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account.

In Salisbury, in the United Kingdom, a targeted murder was attempted using a nerve agent. Such assaults are absolutely unacceptable, and we call on Russia to fully cooperate with the investigations.

We must never lose sight of why we are making the efforts to eliminate these horrific weapons. Until now, we have not talked about the victims. I myself have met with survivors of nuclear weapons attacks, and I will never forget their stories. Victims of chemical weapons have shared similarly accounts. It is important to listen to such personal experiences in order to understand what it is we are fighting for. It has definitely strengthened my resolve to step up efforts for non-proliferation and disarmament.

Weapons of mass destruction are clearly a global threat that we must address together. Only through multilateral solutions, including on the part of the Council, can we effectively prevent the use of these repugnant weapons. The multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament framework is also a key pillar of the international rules-based order. We owe this to the survivors and victims of past attacks, and we owe it to future generations.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8363

Security Council

Seventy-third year

Provisional

8363rd meeting

Thursday, 27 September 2018, 10.30 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Pompeo	(United States of America)
Members:	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Soliz
	China	Mr. Wang Yi
	Côte d'Ivoire	Mr. Amon-Tanoh
	Equatorial Guinea	Mr. Esono Angue
	Ethiopia	Mr. Negewo
	France	Mr. Le Drian
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Abdrakhmanov
	Kuwait	Mr. Al Sabah
	Netherlands	Mr. Blok
	Peru	Mr. Popolizio Bardales
	Poland	Mr. Czaputowicz
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Ms. Wallström
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Hunt

Agenda

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Japan and the Republic of Korea to participate in this meeting.

I am pleased to welcome the distinguished Ministers and representatives gathered here this morning.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Time and time again, over the past quarter-century, the United Nations has made it clear that the world cannot accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is not just the United States position; that is the world's position. Past diplomatic attempts to halt North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development were unsuccessful, but now we are at the dawn of a new day.

Since taking office, President Trump has led the international pressure campaign that has resulted in the first significant diplomatic breakthrough in decades. During President Trump and Chairman Kim's historic Singapore summit, Chairman Kim committed to working towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The two leaders share a common, personal understanding of what must take place for the transformation of the relations between the United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The United States continues to engage with North Korea to implement the commitments made in Singapore. Yesterday, I had a very positive meeting with Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho to discuss how we can move forward on all four commitments in the Singapore joint statement. We also discussed the second summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un.

We must not forget what has brought us this far — the historic international pressure campaign that the Council has made possible through the sanctions that it has imposed. Until the final denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is achieved and fully verified, it is our solemn collective responsibility to fully implement all Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea.

President Trump has made it abundantly clear that if Chairman Kim follows through on his commitments, a much brighter future lies ahead for North Korea and its people, and the United States will be at the forefront of facilitating that bright future. We want to see that time come as quickly as possible, but the path to peace and a brighter future is only through diplomacy and denuclearization. That means that any other path that North Korea may choose will inevitably lead to ever-increasing isolation and pressure. It is imperative for Members of the United Nations to take that to heart. Enforcement of Security Council sanctions must continue vigorously and without fail until we realize the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. The members of the Council must set the example on that effort and we must all hold each other accountable.

Particularly, we must all be accountable for enforcing resolution 2397 (2017), which lowered the annual cap on refined petroleum imports to North Korea. The United States has made its assessment, and we can say in no uncertain terms, that the cap of 500,000 barrels has been breached this year. We continue to see illegal imports of additional refined petroleum using ship-to-ship transfers, which are clearly prohibited under the resolution. As Security Council members, we must convey to the captains of those ships, their owners and anyone else involved in those transfers that we are watching them and that they must cease their illicit activity.

We must all be accountable for cutting off North Korea's illegal coal exports, which provide funds that go directly to its weapons of mass destruction programmes. We must be accountable, too, for curbing the number of North Korean labourers permitted within our borders. The United States is troubled by recent reports that Member States, including members of the Security Council, are hosting new North Korean labourers. That violates the spirit and letter of the Security Council resolutions that we all agreed to uphold.

While sanctions remain part of the total approach we are pursuing to rid the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons, I want to finish on a positive note. We are well into a diplomatic process and we hope — indeed, we want — to see this through to a successful end. I am pleased that, based upon recent exchanges between

President Trump and Chairman Kim, the President has directed me to travel to Pyongyang next month to meet with Chairman Kim and to accelerate that process.

I want to reiterate that the future can be very bright for North Korea if it makes good on its commitment to final, fully verified denuclearization. It will lead to the positive transformation of relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to greater prosperity for the North Korean people, and to an enduring peace. In our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, nations are strong, sovereign, connected, prosperous and at peace, but that vision for the region will never be complete if we fail to bring about this transformation on the Korean peninsula. The Korean people, the region and the world will never realize the full promise of the future if we do not seize this unprecedented diplomatic opening for peace.

I said at the beginning of my statement that we are at the dawn of a new day in the world's relationship with North Korea. We do not yet know what that day will bring, but we are hopeful that the current breakthrough in diplomacy will yield a brighter future for North Korea and a safer world for all of us. I look forward to the discussion.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait.

Sheikh Al Sabah (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, it gives me pleasure to express Kuwait's appreciation for the efforts of the United States and its Permanent Mission during its presidency of the Security Council this month. I am also pleased to see you, Mr. President, in the Chamber for the first time since you took office as Secretary of State, and I appreciate the comprehensive and enriching briefing you have just presented.

Today's meeting on non-proliferation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea comes only 24 hours after the Security Council summit meeting (see S/PV.8362) at which the reduction of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was discussed by Heads of State and Government. Such important meetings, which complement many others held by the Council this year, are a clear indication of the grave danger posed by the threat of nuclear proliferation and WMDs, as well as the utmost priority the Security Council attaches to addressing this danger to humankind, in line with its responsibility for conflict prevention and the maintenance of international peace and security.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is one of the longest-standing issues on the United Nations agenda, as well as one of the most serious. A few months ago, we all followed with great concern the rise in tensions on the Korean peninsula, exacerbated by the danger of military escalation in the region, following the conduct of nuclear tests and the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea, in clear violation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

But the strong and sincere political will demonstrated by the United States and States of the region to choose the path of direct dialogue resulted in the convening of three presidential summits in a period of just four months, in addition to the understandings that emerged therefrom. These summits led to a number of commitments that were supported by the State of Kuwait and the international community and contributed to defusing the threat of a military confrontation and to de-escalating tensions in the Korean peninsula, with a view to achieving the desired goal of denuclearization and the establishment of a comprehensive and lasting peace between the two Koreas.

It is also important to emphasize the key role of the Security Council in launching these diplomatic talks. Indeed, the cohesion and unity of Council members in condemning all North Korea's illegal programmes and activities, and in adopting a series of international resolutions imposing the broadest and most comprehensive sanctions in the history of the United Nations, were central to the decision to start negotiations, as had long been called for in relevant Security Council resolutions.

Since the beginning of its membership of the Council, the State of Kuwait has kept on working to implement all the priorities we declared during our election campaign. These priorities are at the core of our foreign policy, which is founded on the basic principles of international law, promoting the role of preventive diplomacy and redoubling efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully.

On that basis, the State of Kuwait believes that the right way to deal with the issue being discussed at this ministerial meeting of the Security Council is to show full support for direct talks to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis related to North Korea's nuclear

programme and to establish a sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, we emphasize the need for North Korea to comply fully with all its international obligations pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions, including the elimination of its nuclear weapons and illicit programmes, and to re-join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State.

The State of Kuwait also stresses the importance of holding these direct talks in parallel and conjunction with the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions by United Nations Member States, which will provide support for the current course of negotiations. Full commitment to the implementation of Security Council resolutions and the resolution of issues through dialogue and negotiations is the wisest choice and only solution for all parties to resolve this issue.

Before concluding, I would like to emphasize that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs can be guaranteed only through their destruction and total elimination. I recall the first resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which was adopted by consensus and aimed at eliminating all nuclear weapons. The commitment to achieving consensus to put an end to the grave threats posed by such weapons confirms our conviction that the continued unity of Security Council members is the most important element of nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula. The State of Kuwait will remain committed and eager to support dialogue and negotiations so that we can eliminate all nuclear weapons and thereby fully implement the first United Nations resolution.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China.

Mr. Wang Yi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): In the course of this year, we have seen important positive developments on the Korean peninsula. The situation has returned to the track of dialogue and negotiations. Seizing the opportunity of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have been able to turn their relations around and open a new chapter of reconciliation and cooperation.

In April, the entire world watched as Chairman Kim and President Moon took a first step together across the Military Demarcation Line. Last week again, we heard the good news that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea held their third summit this year and issued the Pyongyang Joint Declaration. The two Koreas have thus achieved an overall improvement and development in their relations and jointly undertaken to make the peninsula a peaceful place free of nuclear weapons and nuclear threats. China applauds the political decisiveness and courage demonstrated by the two leaders. China firmly supports the two countries in turning their leaders' consensus into concrete actions, in building mutual trust and in advancing reconciliation and cooperation on the peninsula.

At their historic summit in Singapore in June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States reached important common understandings on comprehensive denuclearization and the building of a peace mechanism on the peninsula. That serves the shared interests of all parties, including the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and meets the need for regional peace and stability. It is also what the international community hopes to see. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are actively preparing for their second summit. China supports their efforts to continue the dialogue, meet each other halfway and secure more deliverables at the meeting.

China's position on the Korean peninsula issue is consistent. China is committed to denuclearization, peace and stability on the peninsula and to resolving issues through dialogue. China has devoted great efforts and energy to that end. The recent positive developments on the peninsula are exactly what China has been working for over the years. At this juncture, we believe that the Security Council has a duty and need to send a clear and united message and accelerate the process of political settlement.

All parties need to work together for a peaceful and stable peninsula. That is an aspiration shared by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and all other countries of the region.

The peninsula issue is essentially about security. To secure peace there, it is critical to address the legitimate security concerns of all parties in an appropriate and balanced manner. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has suspended its nuclear and missile tests and gradually dismantled relevant facilities. The United States and the Republic of Korea, for their part, have

suspended large-scale military exercises. Building on that, a timely release of declaration ending the war would dispel the spectre of war on the peninsula and manifest the political resolve to forsake war. It will help build basic trust, further facilitate denuclearization and put in place the conditions necessary for a final peace accord.

In China's view, a wise political decision must be taken on this. All parties need to work together for a completely denuclearized peninsula, which is a prerequisite for lasting peace. It is what we must do to uphold the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is the shared objective of concerted global efforts. China believes that the most effective way to advance denuclearization is in parallel with the building of a peace mechanism on the peninsula so that the two tracks can support and reinforce one another and be settled together.

The main players in that process are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, but all stakeholders are obligated to play their part. The Six-Party Talks have played an important role and will remain an indispensable multilateral platform. The Security Council should also form consensus in a timely manner to provide a driving force and international guarantee.

All parties need to work together for a peninsula of mutually beneficial cooperation. Denuclearization is ultimately aimed at bringing a better life of greater prosperity, peace and happiness to the people of the peninsula and the region.

Over the past decades, cooperation around the peninsula has stalled due to various disruptions, but this year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made a major decision to shift its focus to economic development. That decision deserves to be welcomed and supported by the international community. As the denuclearization process moves forward, on the condition that they do not violate Council resolutions, all parties can gradually foster practical cooperation whenever where conditions are met as as to improve people's well-being. We hope that the day denuclearization is achieved will also be the day that development and revitalization come to the peninsula.

In carrying out its mandate under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has adopted several resolutions related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As long as those resolutions remain valid, they must continue to be fully, completely and accurately implemented. China firmly believes that pressure is not the goal. Implementing sanctions and promoting political settlement are equally important under Council resolutions. Neither can be neglected, replaced by the other or opted for alone.

There is a provision in Council resolutions that the Council is prepared to modify the sanction measures in the light of compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Given the positive developments in the inter-Korean relations and those between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States, as well as the important pledges and actions taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on denuclearization, China believes that the Council will need in due course to consider invoking that provision in order to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other relevant parties to further advance denuclearization.

This year marks the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement. China's consistent goal and the objective of the international community has been to realize complete denuclearization and build a peace mechanism on the peninsula. China calls on all parties to demonstrate political courage, advance dialogue and negotiation, and together work for lasting peace. China will continue to make its due contributions in this regard.

The President: I now give the floor to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Mr. Hunt (United Kingdom): In March 1963, President Kennedy predicted that as many as 25 nations would soon develop nuclear weapons, posing what he described as the greatest possible danger to the survival of humankind. In the end, his bleak prophecy to never come to pass. Seven years after Kennedy voiced his fears, the world summoned the collective wisdom to create the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which now has 191 States parties. All but a handful of countries put aside their differences and agreed that global security — indeed, the existence of the human race — depended on halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one country signed the NPT and then sought to withdraw from it. Only one country promised, in the Treaty, never to develop nuclear weapons and then did exactly that. That country is

North Korea, which has tested six nuclear devices in the past 12 years.

Today, the international community shares a collective responsibility to ensure that North Korea complies once again with the rules on which the safety of every nation depends. Britain welcomes North Korea's decision to re-engage in diplomacy since the beginning of this year. We are encouraged by the meeting between President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang last week. We hope that North Korea's repeated promises to denuclearize are genuine, but we note the lack of concrete steps so far. Action counts for more than assurances; deeds must follow words. North Korea must comprehensively, verifiably and irreversibly abandon its nuclear weapons and the means to build them, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Council.

Until that moment comes, Britain believes that the sanctions agreed by the international community should continue to be rigorously enforced, reflecting our shared belief that North Korea's nuclear ambitions threaten the safety of all of our peoples. The Council adopted the relevant resolutions as one and we should enforce them as one until the conditions that caused their adoption have decisively and irrevocably changed. Britain will continue to play our part in this effort.

We are supporting the work of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the United Nations Panel of Experts. The onus rests on the whole Council to prevent North Korea from evading sanctions, particularly the controls on refined petroleum products. We support the assessment presented by Secretary of State Pompeo and the United States, which demonstrates that North Korea has systematically violated the controls placed on the import of these products. Indeed, the annual cap for 2018 has already been broken.

This year, Britain sent two Royal Navy ships, the *HMS Sutherland* and the *HMS Albion*, to the Pacific, where they have helped to monitor illegal fuel transfers. A third ship, the *HMS Argyle*, is due in East Asia later this year. The members of the Security Council, especially the five permanent members, have a duty to uphold and enforce the sanctions contained in the resolutions, which we ourselves supported. We must not allow the authority of the Security Council to be undermined.

Today, North Korea's leadership has a choice to make. In a country where 200,000 children are acutely malnourished, half of all schools have no access to running water, and only 3 per cent of roads are paved, the regime has squandered the nation's resources and deepened the poverty of its people by pursuing an illegal stockpile of nuclear weapons. Far from bringing prestige or security, this arsenal has only increased tensions in East Asia and brought upon North Korea the most extensive economic sanctions ever imposed by the Security Council in the twenty-first century.

As recently as 1973, North and South Korea had about the same gross domestic product per capita. Since then, decades of communist economic failure in North Korea have opened up a 20-fold disparity. Today, North Korea's gross domestic product per capita is less than 5 per cent of South Korea's.

But it is not too late to change course. Just as President Kennedy's prediction turned out to be pessimistic, there is nothing inevitable about the road along which North Korea has so far travelled. Before his regime wastes even more resources, creates yet more poverty and triggers still greater confrontations, Kim Jong Un could decide to allow his country to flourish in peace and safety. He could choose to heed the will of the Security Council, keep his own promises and relinquish the nuclear arsenal that has brought only misery and tension. The decision rests on his shoulders. Until then, the Security Council should hold fast to the resolutions we have passed.

The President: I give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Mr. Blok (Netherlands): I thank the presidency for organizing today's meeting on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a subject that is at the top of our agenda. It is an issue of vital importance to peace and security in the region and to the world at large. We have come a long way in the past year. As Henry Ford once said, "coming together is the beginning, keeping together is progress, working together is success".

The Security Council has worked hard to achieve success by optimizing its strengths, striking the right balance between two main ingredients — pressure and dialogue. I think it is safe to say that we have succeeded, thanks to our unity, which is a vital component that should never be underestimated. Our show of unity was of course brought about by the gravity of last year's events: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's

multiple ballistic-missile tests and nuclear tests and its development of a nuclear and missile programme that posed a threat to regional and global security and to the global non-proliferation regime. These events gave us a shared sense of purpose and highlighted the urgent need to bring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea back to the negotiating table.

In response, the Security Council has worked together tirelessly and with clear results. It adopted three far-reaching resolutions — resolutions 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) — within the space of five months, resulting in the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever. This forced Pyongyang to come back to the negotiating table and created a window of diplomatic opportunity that still exists today. The Republic of Korea and the United States seized this opportunity in 2018 by organizing high-level talks. President Moon, President Trump and you, Secretary of State Pompeo, rose to the occasion, and we are grateful for that.

The international community should maintain the pressure until the Democratic People's Republic of Korea meets its international obligations. We should never underestimate the power a united Council can wield. A united Security Council will keep up the pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A united Council will ensure full and effective implementation of sanctions and pave the way for complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. And a united Council will support diplomatic talks and reassure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that we are willing to engage with it once it has taken concrete steps towards denuclearization.

To achieve that, a well-functioning Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) is essential. It can play a key role in taking action against sanctions violations and in minimizing the humanitarian impact. As Chair of the Committee, the Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to do its utmost to this end. We need a Panel of Experts that can do its job in an effective, independent and secure manner.

Last but not least, we need to be persistent. It will not be easy, but no effort should be spared in seeking a peaceful solution. There is simply too much at stake. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to evade sanctions in order to advance its nuclear-weapon programme, often with the possibly unwitting assistance of other countries. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea might still be moving towards a deployable nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile. There is still a risk of the further spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and delivery-system technology. This would further undermine the global non-proliferation regime.

In conclusion, let me say this — failure is not an option. Failure benefits no one. If we act in unison and fully implement the Security Council's resolutions, historic breakthroughs are possible. The world is watching, and the Council must act in unity, because unity is strength.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.

Mr. Negewo (Ethiopia): I thank the United States presidency for organizing today's ministerial-level meeting on an issue that has serious implications for regional and international peace and security.

A year ago, I presided over a meeting of the Security Council during the Ethiopian presidency at which we discussed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issue (see S/PV.8053). We all recall the tense situation that was prevailing in the Korean peninsula at that time. Since then, we have come a long way in de-escalating the situation. Determination and diplomacy, coupled with all our united measures at the Security Council, have led to three summit-level meetings between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and another between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. More importantly, it has resulted in the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's latest commitment to dismantling a missile-engine test site and launch platform as well as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in the presence of experts, as set forth in the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, is indeed a step in the right direction. The important steps taken by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Pyongyang summit, particularly military confidence-building measures and an agreement to reduce military tensions along the two sides' heavily militarized border, will also significantly contribute to reducing tension and avoiding any miscalculations on the Korean peninsula. We hope that these commitments and steps will lay the basis for the denuclearization of

the Korean peninsula and the advancement of peace in North-East Asia.

Finding a comprehensive, peaceful, political and diplomatic solution to this long-standing issue and ensuring the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula requires continued dialogue. It is in that context that we welcome, Mr. President, your readiness to travel to Pyongyang to continue dialogue and possibly make more progress on the issue.

In the meantime, we recognize the importance of ensuring full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We note implementation gaps in relation to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. That requires the continued cooperation of Member States, and I would like to reaffirm Ethiopia's commitment to fully implementing the relevant Council resolutions.

Overall, the recent developments that we have all been observing on the political track, and the efforts to ensure the full implementation of Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, require the continued support of the international community. That is why we support the call made by the Secretary-General last week in that regard. The parties should be encouraged to maintain the momentum in their endeavours to achieve sustainable peace, security and the complete and verifiable demilitarization of the Korean peninsula, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Lastly, preserving the unity of the Council also remains crucial, and we hope to continue to do so in facilitating the quest for a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the issues surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the ultimate objective of achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.

Mr. Czaputowicz (Poland): I would like to thank Secretary of State Michael Pompeo for his briefing on the efforts to denuclearize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Poland greatly appreciates today's timely debate, as well as the transparent and open approach to this important subject.

A few months ago, we were all pleased to hear that one of the most complicated problems of nuclear proliferation affecting regional and international security might be resolved peacefully, thanks to goodwill, a spirit of cooperation and common interests. We all agree that long-lasting peace on the Korean peninsula can be achieved only through peaceful means. We therefore welcome the continued progress in the inter-Korean dialogue. We are pleased to note that the third summit organized this year between the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, which took place a few days ago, was another important step in invigorating and maintaining the dialogue on the peninsula.

We also welcome the diplomatic process related to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, marked by the historic summit in Singapore earlier this year. We hope that further steps in that regard can be made following the intensive contacts between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that context, we all welcomed the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the suspension of its nuclear and intercontinental-ballistic-missile tests. Another step in the right direction was the destruction of a nuclear-weapon-test site in Punggye-ri. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if that threat will continue in the future. It will be crucial to maintain the momentum, keep the window of opportunity open and move forward on a path to de-escalation.

The denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must remain a top priority for the entire international community. Despite the positive developments, Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes are still a threat to international security and stability in the region. We are also deeply concerned about the risk posed by the potential proliferation of sensitive goods and technology to other States or non-State actors. Pyongyang continues to defy Security Council resolutions in an increasingly sophisticated manner. We reiterate our position that despite the political and legal difficulties that may be involved, it is mandatory for all States, without exception, to comply with their obligations arising from the relevant Council resolutions. We are well aware that lasting peace cannot be achieved without the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in compliance with Security Council resolutions. Despite the encouraging developments and declarations, the process has not yet started. We must therefore remain united in maintaining consistent pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We call on other Security Council members to show their collective intention to fully implement sanctions, end the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to circumvent United Nations sanctions and prevent other Member States from undermining them. Council members should recommit to implementing all existing and future sanctions so as to put maximum pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take immediate and meaningful steps towards denuclearization. The progress made so far has been possible thanks to the common and concerted action of all States. We hope that that same spirit of cooperation and unanimity will characterize future activities in this area. Positive developments will have profound implications and beneficial consequences for international relations, including enhancing the credibility and reliability of the international non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, as the sole sponsor of General Assembly resolutions on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, we would like to express our hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will soon adhere to the Convention, filling a gap and bringing it close to universalization.

Another crucial step for Pyongyang towards de-escalation and confidence-building would be signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I would like to remind the Council of the Treaty's effectiveness in helping us to deal with the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, even though it has not yet entered into force.

As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Poland has been actively supporting international efforts to promote peace and stability in the region. We will continue to engage in all activities that can lead to the permanent denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. That also means supporting further initiatives and actions aimed at reducing tension and facilitating dialogue. Poland will continue its engagement in international bodies, as well as in other global and regional initiatives. Examples of our engagement in that regard include our recent chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as well as ongoing international partnerships for nuclear-disarmament verification.

In conclusion, let me express our deep conviction that the current momentum will not be wasted. The list of activities is long: denuclearizing North Korea, strengthening the universalization of non-proliferation regimes, securing verification mechanisms, implementing good practices and tightening international cooperation in the field. If we want to be successful, we must stand united.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): In the past few months, considerable progress has been achieved in resolving the problems on the Korean peninsula. The region has seen a significant reduction in tensions as a result of the moratorium declared by Pyongyang in April on missile launches and nuclear tests, the closure of the nuclear-weapon-test site in Punggye-ri and the decision by the United States and the Republic of Korea to postpone their summer military manoeuvres indefinitely. We would like to point to the successful implementation of the inter-Korean agreements detailed in the Panmunjom Declaration of 27 April and the September visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea, during which the Pyongyang Declaration was signed. It states the Korean parties' intention to broaden the scope of their cooperation, as well as Pyongyang's obligations to dismantle the Tonchan-Ni missile range and close its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, which gives us hope that the situation in this part of the world can be stabilized.

Russia actively supports a rapprochement between South and North Korea and a settlement of the problems on the Korean peninsula in general. For a long time now we have been urging our partners to work on this, including within the framework of implementing the road map established by Russia and China last summer, which isnow de facto being implemented. We believe that building trust is the key to finding a political and diplomatic path to resolving the issues on the Korean peninsula. The agreement reached in Pyongyang between the two Koreas on the restoration of rail and road links is an important step in that direction. We call on Council members to support Pyongyang and Seoul's initiatives, which fully respond to the spirit of our resolutions. Any possibility that the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can become an instrument of collective punishment is absolutely unacceptable. Any lack of trust between Washington

and Pyongyang is an obstacle to developing joint measures that both sides could undertake simultaneously and gradually with a view to advancing the overall settlement process. We suggest working together to consider a system of international security guarantees, which would be a definitive prerequisite for resolving the task of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.

In view of the willingness that Pyongyang has shown to cooperate and the positive progress it has made in stabilizing the situation in the region, the policy of Western partners aimed at further sanctions crackdowns on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seems increasingly ill-timed. Considering that Pyongyang has taken a number of important steps towards denuclearization, it would seem logical to support those efforts and propose something in return in order to maintain this positive momentum. In that connection, I would like to hear some of our colleagues in the Council explain their reasons for obstinately rejecting any possibility of a positive signal from the Security Council regarding Pyongyang's steps towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

We would like to point out that any negotiation is a two-way street. The steps taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's towards gradual disarmament should be accompanied by reductions in sanctions. Actions deserve reactions. That is essential if we are to avoid situations like the one, for example, that arose with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when our American colleagues invented a pretext for withdrawing unilaterally from the Iranian nuclear deal, thereby violating their obligations under Security Council resolutions. The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations and its Security Council should work to support the settlement process and the inter-Korean dialogue, not to become obstacles to them. Only then will it be possible to talk about an effective solution to the issues that have accumulated in the region, including the nuclear issue, on a basis of mutually acceptable agreements.

Achieving that with sanctions and pressure would be difficult if not impossible. The extreme lengths that the Council's sanctions instruments have gone to already mean that Member States and international organizations are often unable to support in a normal regime even humanitarian, sports and diplomatic links — which have nothing to do with the development of nuclear missile programmes — to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The further expansion of sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has already gone beyond measures to block the channels for financing Pyongyang's banned nuclear-missile programmes and is threatening North Korean citizens with social, economic and humanitarian hardships that are simply unacceptable. Incidentally, it is relevant to remember here that besides a sanctions component, all Security Council resolutions in this area include provisions for measures for achieving a political and diplomatic settlement of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and ignoring them is tantamount to non-compliance with the Council's consensus agreements on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The so-called autonomous, or secondary sanctions imposed by the United States and some of its allies on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other States, and going around and over Security Council sanctions, are even worse. Such unilateral restrictions not only undermine the sovereignty and legitimate interests of Member States and contradict the norms and rules of international trade, they also undermine the integrity of the Security Council's own agreed restrictions. We once again urge the countries imposing them to stop this practice. We are increasingly seeing them become a tool for unfair competition and for scaring business operators away from third countries. The example of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in that regard is very instructive. It is extremely difficult to conduct business even when the Security Council sanctions regime does not forbid it, thanks to the existence of these illegal practices and entrepreneurs' fear of ending up on a banned list. Any attempts to bless such restrictions by invoking the authority of the Council or its Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), or to question one or another country's sticking to the strict implementation of the Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are unacceptable.

We support both the Council and its 1718 Committee in making every possible effort to find political and diplomatic solutions to the issues on the Korean peninsula and to help to establish a multilateral security mechanism in North-East Asia. We also consider it the right moment for the Security Council to send a clear message in support of the positive trends in the situation regarding the Korean the peninsula. That could be done, for example, by adopting a corresponding resolution, a

draft of which we would like to prepare and submit to the Council for discussion.

We also consider it important to regularly assess the advisability of reviewing some of the restrictions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as Pyongyang makes progress towards renouncing its nuclear weapons. It would be possible to come up with at least some small steps, for instance. Security Council resolutions allow for a review of limitations in the case of political advances. As I already mentioned, the parties to the Panmunjom and Pyongyang Declarations, for example, affirmed their interest in implementing joint economic projects. If we all welcome those agreements, we should think about having the 1718 Committee come up with special conditions for considering applications for exemptions from the sanctions regime for the purpose of implementing inter-Korean cooperative projects agreed on by Pyongyang and Seoul.

Russia is ready to work as closely as possible with all interested countries with the aim of ensuring peace, stability and a comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Korean peninsula on a basis of equal, non-discriminatory negotiations with the participation of all interested parties.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

Mr. Le Drian (France) (*spoke in French*): North Korea continues to represent the most serious proliferation crisis that the international community has had to deal with in the early years of the twenty-first century. It is a major challenge to our collective security, and I would like to thank Secretary of State Michael Pompeo for organizing today's meeting.

What is the situation? The process that has been launched between South Korea and North Korea, on the one hand, and between the United States and North Korea, on the other, has helped to reduce the tensions in the Korean peninsula since the beginning of this year. The Singapore summit, initiated by the United States, was an important event in that regard, and we should certainly welcome it, especially in the light of the mistrust that prevailed throughout 2017. We have taken note of the commitments made by North Korea on 19 September in the Pyongyang Declaration aimed at easing tensions and bringing about a rapprochement between the two Koreas. In that regard, I welcome the diplomatic efforts of President Moon, which were also on view again at last week's inter-Korean summit.

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as long as North Korea has not given up its nuclear and ballistic programmes, they will continue to pose a threat to the region and the whole world. The Council's priority should be to induce North Korea to display a significant willingness to retreat from its ambition to build an operational nuclear arsenal and to make concrete moves in that direction. As a matter of fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency recently pointed out that North Korea had continued its nuclear activities in the past few months, as did the United Nations Panel of Experts assisting the Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). We should also highlight the fact that North Korea has not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and continues to maintain military chemical and biological capabilities. The investigation conducted following the death of Kim Jong-nam in February 2017 in Kuala Lumpur established links with North Korea.

As a result, and despite the welcome reduction in tensions, the situation remains a threat to international security. As long as North Korea's nuclear and ballistic programmes continue to exist, any incident is capable of provoking an escalation. Furthermore, while this programme continues, there is always a risk of secondary proliferation from North Korea to other countries, and even to non-State entities, which will persist until North Korea's arsenal has been eliminated and its nuclear and ballistic experts have been converted back to civilian sectors.

The Council's task must be to keep up the pressure so that this time North Korea keeps to its commitments. For the process to be successful, it must be based on concrete measures, and North Korea must demonstrate a genuine willingness to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic programmes in a comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible manner in line with Council resolutions. We expect it to go above and beyond what are admittedly symbolic and reversible gestures, such as announcing the destruction of its nuclear test site. In that regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency will certainly have an important role to play, for which it is actively preparing. Experts from the nuclear-weapon States should be at the forefront in verifying the most highly sensitive activities. France will be ready to assist when the time comes. A first concrete step could be making a complete and accurate inventory of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic programme.

How should we approach this? First and foremost, we should support the existing dialogue, because it is vital to restoring confidence and making progress towards denuclearization. At the same time, we must collectively maintain a firm policy with regard to North Korea by rigorously applying the Security Council sanctions. Sanctions are not an end in themselves but rather a strategy for applying pressure in the pursuit of a political solution. I think that the Security Council must remain united on the fact that the sanctions remain essential. We should continue to be particularly vigilant in ensuring that we all respect our obligations under international law. In that regard, I commend the remarkable work done by the Panel of Experts and the Sanctions Committee, both of which are essential tools for verifying the effective application of sanctions, and here I want to highlight the importance we attach to the independence and impartiality of the work of the Panel of Experts.

As several previous speakers have already mentioned, we must combat the strategies deployed by North Korea to circumvent the sanctions through various illicit activities ranging from money-laundering to ocean trans-shipment operations of oil and coal.

President Kim Jong Un says that he wants denuclearization, and he has asked us not to doubt his intentions. For our part, we will judge him by his actions, and we call for a united and determined response from the international community that respects the decisions of the Council. The credibility and sustainability of our collective security architecture — and of non-proliferation in particular — are at stake. That is the path that France wishes to see the Council take here.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Mr. Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan): We are grateful to the United States presidency and to you personally, Secretary Pompeo, for this opportunity to consider further steps for achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Kazakhstan knows first-hand that nuclear disarmament is a complex and comprehensive process that demands a step-by-step approach, with incredible effort, immense patience, mutual concessions and good faith on the part of all stakeholders. That is why we invite the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to follow the successful experience and bright path taken by Kazakhstan, and I hope that my dialogue with my colleague from North Korea will be meaningful.

As we all know, despite the great temptation to become a new nuclear Power upon our independence in 1991 and the unpredictable geopolitical uncertainties in our region at that time, my President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, made the momentous decision to abandon the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which we had inherited, as well as to shut down the world's second largest nuclear test site, at Semipalatinsk. We steered that ship successfully through uncharted waters and eventually became a trusted and reliable partner for the world community, which in turn has invested in us, resulting in many economic gains for both our nation and our people. Today Kazakhstan is a progressive, stable and prosperous State with the ambitious goal of becoming one of the world's 30 most advanced economies and countries in the next few decades.

Our robust steps to achieve denuclearization were a testament to strong political will, and they succeeded thanks to the exemplary cooperative efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States. I believe that such practical, pragmatic and mutually beneficial collaboration could be used in other, new circumstances for tackling new threats emerging in our world today. We are also deeply grateful to the United Kingdom, France and China for their constructive support to our anti-nuclear endeavours. It is indeed remarkable that all five nuclear Powers simultaneously signed the Protocol to the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, also known as the Semipalatinsk Treaty. It is a good example of mutual goodwill, indicating that despite the differences among the five permanent members of the Security Council, there can be further joint efforts on important issues aimed at strengthening non-proliferation.

Our invaluable experience says that disarmament is the best way to build confidence. Having chosen a nuclear-free path, we went further, together with our four neighbouring fraternal countries, in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. It is the first and still the only one of its kind in the northern hemisphere, flanked by two large nuclear Powers and not far from some other actors in this area.

Our President also initiated an extremely important project aimed at establishing trusting and trustworthy cooperation in Asia on a broad scale. In 1992 we created the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building

Measures in Asia (CICA), which now unites 27 States in the region and works to avert threats to stability in the region by successfully tackling many challenges. It is a unique regional structure in which Iran and Israel, India and Pakistan and other States with complex relations sit at one table, side by side, to negotiate measures in mutual respect and goodwill. We would therefore gladly receive the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan into CICA membership so that we can welcome North-East Asia into our fold and lay new ground for solidarity and trust. My President's experience and further ideas on confidence-building measures were shared with the Council in January at the signature event of Kazakhstan's presidency of the Security Council (see S/PV.8160).

Today's developments on the Korean peninsula demonstrate the relevance of this approach. We commend the two Korean States for their meaningful efforts and joint projects to restore an inclusive dialogue. We also greatly appreciate the decision of the United States and the Republic of Korea to suspend their regular joint regional military exercises. All of these steps encourage the parties to continue with the peaceful political and diplomatic measures that made possible the historic Singapore summit and the continuing inter-Korean summits. We strongly support such endeavours and welcome the outcome of the third meeting of the two Korean leaders, with further important agreements contained in the joint Pyongyang Declaration. The continued friendly political dialogue and mutually beneficial projects between Pyongyang and Seoul have the potential to become the most effective way for the long-term settlement of tensions in the region, resulting in mutually acceptable solutions for full, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.

How can the Security Council better contribute to that noble cause? First of all, unity in the Council must be preserved and harnessed to achieve that key overarching task. We hope that there will be a speedy settlement to some of the remaining disagreements among the members of the Council on the basis of mutual trust and endurance.

Kazakhstan understands the serious concerns regarding the continued violations of Security Council resolutions and related sanctions requirements from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and others. It has to be realized that our constructive actions are based on good intentions, with an understanding that sanctions are interim measures designed to solve problematic issues by peaceful, political and diplomatic means.

Based on its practical experience, Kazakhstan advocates for transparency and a gradual process in the massive task of disarmament, which must give equal consideration to the concerns of all parties and include a mutual realization of the commitments pledged. My President noted during the January meeting that providing security assurances to the disarming party is an important sine qua non for moving forward (see S/PV.8160).

In that specific context, Kazakhstan suggests considering the possibility of developing a road map for the phased denuclearization of North Korea, with solid security guarantees from the five permanent member of the Council, in return for the full implementation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of all of its obligations and its return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The compulsory implementation of that course of action could be enshrined in a relevant Council resolution, with clear consequences if not fulfilled.

Kazakhstan is ready to share its experience and provide technical expertise to realize a phased and transparent process of denuclearization. We are confident that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be able to replicate our success and even go beyond by setting a practical example to inspire the North-East Asia region to become the second nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere. Such zones should be necessarily encouraged by obtaining security guarantees from the five permanent members of the Council. In that regard we reiterate our hope the Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone will be endorsed by the final remaining member of the group of five permanent members.

Finally, the situation today on the Korean peninsula is much improved and more favourable than ever before. It prompts us to focus more on working with determination and to redouble our goodwill, patience and political will to successfully advance towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. That, in turn, will result in new stability for the region and the world at large, on the understanding that peace in one country is an investment in global peace, for we are all bound together by a common humanity and shared destiny for all.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Mr. Amon-Tanoh (Côte d'Ivoire) (*spoke in French*): Côte d'Ivoire is grateful to the United States presidency of the Security Council for organizing this briefing on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The topic of today's debate is all the more relevant as it comes in a context marked by recurrent violations of international treaties and Security Council resolutions that aim to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of weapons of mass destruction.

As a State party to all treaties prohibiting nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, Côte d'Ivoire shares the concerns of the international community in the face of the worrying erosion of the non-proliferation regime and the serious threats posed to international peace and security. Persistent security tensions on the Korean peninsula, fuelled by North Korea's nuclear ambitions, as well as reports of violations of the Security Council's sanctions regime, are representative of the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .

In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire asks that North Korea respect its obligations, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We encourage the North Korean authorities to take all the necessary measures for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Côte d'Ivoire commends the recent measures taken by Pyongyang to that effect, the most significant of which remains the dismantling of its main nuclear test site at Punggye-ri. We urge North Korea to do even more in order to create an environment of mutual trust with all States in the region, as well as all stakeholders to the North Korean nuclear issue.

My country welcomes the calming of the situation that resulted in the return of the remains of American soldiers who died during the 1950-1953 Korean War, and the historic summit of 12 June between President Donald Trump and President Kim Jong Un. Lasting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula will be possible only through the commitment of all States in the region to favour dialogue and the peaceful settlement of their differences.

My country believes that stakeholders need to build trust between each other. In that regard, we are happy to note the improving relations between North and South Korea, as manifested by the third summit in one year between their respective Presidents, which was held in Pyongyang in September. The summit was another step towards the much-desired reconciliation of the two Korean States and the realization of a common ambition for a zone of permanent peace. The summit also consolidated the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed on 27 April, as well as the achievements of the two previous summits, particularly the reduction of political and military tensions, inter-Korean cooperation and denuclearization.

Côte d'Ivoire also welcomes the willingness of the Korean leaders to engage in mutually beneficial economic and humanitarian cooperation. We pay tribute to the sponsors of that progress, notably the United States of America and China, and we hope that the ongoing dynamic of collaboration will lead to the signing of a peace treaty and the total denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The Security Council has a duty to support and accompany the ongoing normalization process. Its firmness will also be decisive in the implementation of the sanctions regime and its unity of action in promoting respect for international treaties against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that only a collective commitment by the Council to support dialogue among all parties will result in the resolution of the current crisis on the Korean peninsula. We also reaffirm our commitment to the virtues of multilateralism and call for the strengthening of international frameworks, within which consensual solutions to contemporary challenges are developed.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Peru.

Mr. Popolizio Bardales (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): We welcome the convening of this briefing and highlight the importance of addressing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula at the Security Council. We would also like to thank Secretary of State Pompeo for the important information provided and convey Peru's support for the important efforts that his Government has been making.

My country notes with deep concern the serious threat to international peace and security posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As has been

mentioned, that threat constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the specific mandates of the Council.

In that regard, we emphasize that North Korea's programmes and their related activities must be abandoned in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We believe that, for as long as that does not happen, the sanctions imposed by the Council must remain in force and be strictly implemented by all States.

Peru complies with implementing those sanctions within its jurisdiction and considers that the Council must remain vigilant in determining and sanctioning any possible non-compliance, wherever it occurs. We wish to emphasize the unanimous commitment of the members of the Security Council on that issue. Peru attaches the greatest importance to maintaining unity with a view to achieving denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. In that regard, we would like to commend the high-level diplomacy deployed by the South Korean and United States authorities, including you, Mr. Secretary of State, and we hope that the latter can begin to produce concrete results on denuclearization. This is clearly a complex issue, which dates back to the Korean War. That is why we value the progress made in recent months, which has so far served to alleviate tensions, build confidence, reduce the risk of misunderstandings or miscalculations and ultimately lay the foundations for denuclearization.

We welcome the agreements that were achieved at the third inter-Korean summit, held last week in Pyongyang, which include concrete measures aimed towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and reflect the intentions of both countries to create a new platform of trust with a view to achieving peace. In the light of those developments, we believe that the sanctions regime imposed by the Council has proved to be an effective means of bringing the North Korean Government closer to the negotiating table, without leading to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation for the country's civilian population. In that regard, we would like to acknowledge initiative of the United States, under whose leadership the sanctions regime has been strengthened, and to stress once again the importance of multilateralism, international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes to face threats and challenges that are common to us all.

Peru, as a country committed to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, is party to all the relevant international instruments. That includes the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which makes Latin America and the Caribbean a region free of nuclear weapons, and the most recent United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We aspire to a world free of the threat posed by such weapons, and I would therefore like to conclude by reaffirming Peru's full and constant readiness to contribute to all the efforts being made to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Equatorial Guinea.

Mr. Esono Angue (Equatorial Guinea) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, the delegation of Equatorial Guinea would like to thank Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Government of the United States of America for convening this debate and congratulate the United States on its excellent work as President of the Council this September.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global nuclear disarmament is one of the main purposes and missions of the United Nations and Equatorial Guinea. In that regard, my Government maintains a firm policy of rejecting and strongly condemning any action involving launching ballistic missiles, carrying out nuclear tests, developing a military nuclear programme, as well as violating the relevant Council resolutions that strengthen international sanctions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

The nuclear and ballistic programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea do not simply represent a regional concern, but a global one, as the consequences and effects of any accidental or intentional nuclear detonation would be catastrophic at the global level. Equatorial Guinea has always maintained that sanctions themselves are not an objective; rather, they are a means to an end. They must therefore be applied with proportionality and prudence under the premise that all peaceful means have been exhausted, which prevents them from causing damage to the weakest and most vulnerable sectors. It must be clear that, when sanctions are imposed by the Council, all States must comply with them.

But we cannot presume that the current sanctions mechanism of the Committee established pursuant to

resolution 1718 (2006) is currently the most effective. Equatorial Guinea is in favour of improving that mechanism; establishing stricter criteria for verification of evidence; strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through international cooperation and consultation; deterring in order to maintain the moratorium on nuclear tests; setting explicit time limits for resolutions adopted by the Committee; drawing up a protocol of action for Committee members; taking practical and effective measures to disseminate and make universally known the 1718 sanctions regime, on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; seeking the possibility of sanctions that cause fewer humanitarian crises and have a lesser impact on third countries; and helping developing countries strengthen their capacity to enforce and implement sanctions.

We are witnessing both rare opportunities and serious challenges to achieving the lasting peace and common development of human society. An example of that is the peace and complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which remains a main theme of the Council. The latest developments in 2018 regarding the situation of the Korean peninsula are a sign of hope. I am referring to the high-level inter-Korean negotiations between the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong Un, and the President of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae-in, and to the summit that took place in June in Singapore between the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, and the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which, if crystallized, would represent profound and hopeful changes for the international community. In that regard, we would like to highlight the actions of those three statesmen, who have put the supreme interests of their peoples and humankind ahead of their ideological convictions.

We have before us a unique opportunity that should not be missed to achieve the pacification and non-proliferation of the Korean peninsula. The third inter-Korean Summit, held on 19 September in Pyongyang between Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in, is a thread of hope. The agreements that were reached therein are another sign of the will to pursue rapprochement and good intentions in the search for peace and understanding. The intention of the two Koreas to present a joint bid to host and organize the 2032 Olympic Games is a sign of a step in the right direction. Equatorial Guinea can only celebrate and encourage the two brother countries to continue their efforts in the search for understanding with the final objective of signing a peace agreement. We also encourage the two countries to continue to promote encounters and contact between families separated by the Korean War — a welcome step, as evidenced by the emotional and moving inter-Korean family reunion event in August.

Finally, Equatorial Guinea likewise calls on the countries involved in the crisis on the Korean peninsula, those with influence in the region and the international community to refrain from any act that might hinder the negotiations. On the contrary, they should do everything possible to reach a satisfactory solution for all and avoid a situation where there are winners and losers. We call on the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council so as to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear and ballistic programmes and make that a success and a milestone in history.

Equatorial Guinea stands ready to provide its small contribution in finding a definitive solution by offering our territory, with its excellent facilities, as a neutral site for a possible future meeting among all the parties involved in the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden.

Ms. Wallström (Sweden): I am sure members vividly remembered when world leaders gathered here in New York one year ago for the General Assembly. The tensions on the Korean peninsula were alarmingly high and dangerous. Since then, positive historic progress has been made and we have new momentum, but substantial challenges remain. As much as we would like, this is neither a quick nor a simple process; it will take time. The unity of the Council has been decisive for the progress made so far, and continued unity will be critical. Your personal engagement, Secretary Pompeo, is very important. We thank you for that.

The Security Council has shown strong resolve regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula, including by adopting numerous substantial resolutions by consensus. Sweden contributed to those efforts, including by consistently pushing for diplomatic solutions. Our resolve must now be geared towards making further progress with the two pronged approach.

First, we need to effectively implement the six existing sanctions until the demands of the Council are met. There a widespread violations of the sanctions regime in a range of areas, including arms exports, the petroleum trade and financial transactions. We call on all Member States to fulfil their obligations and ensure full implementation.

There is no doubt that the responsibility for the dire humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fundamentally rests with the Government. At the same time, there are concerns about indirect negative impact of sanctions. Enhanced efforts are therefore needed to ensure that the humanitarian exemptions are safeguarded. A generation of North Koreans must not be lost due to malnutrition and lack of medicines.

Secondly, we must continue to encourage and support diplomatic efforts. Progress in the inter-Korean dialogue is very encouraging. Important agreements, including most recently in the summit in Pyongyang last week, have been achieved, and the summit between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Singapore in June was indeed significant. All parties must now work to maintain momentum and build trust and confidence. A step-by-step approach is needed to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that means translating its commitments into concrete undertakings without delay. It is important that the International Atomic Energy Association be given a role early in the process.

Creative diplomacy will continue to be critical, and the parties should explore ways to move from the armistice towards a peace agreement. The need for regional collaborative arrangements, including on security, as we have heard others say here, is evident. An international framework that deals with all the different aspects and can contribute to sustainability is essential. We welcome the support of the Secretary-General of the United Nations system. My country, with its presence in Pyongyang, and as a long-standing member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, will continue to assist diplomatic efforts.

The situation on the Korean peninsula has far-reaching implications for international peace and security. It is also vital for good neighbourly relations in North-East Asia. Recent progress has shown that it is possible to diffuse tensions through dialogue and cooperation, and that should be recognized by the Security Council. The newfound opportunity should be seized. We must now work together and stay united towards a peaceful, prosperous and nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): On this occasion, as President Evo Morales Ayma said in yesterday's meeting (see S/PV.8362), the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most important on the Security Council's agenda, and therefore of special importance for my country. Bolivia is part of the first densely populated region in the world to declare itself free of nuclear weapons, just over 50 years ago, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America — the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Moreover, Bolivia has enshrined in its Constitution the prohibition of the manufacture and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on the Bolivian territory, as well as the internment, transit and deposit of nuclear and toxic waste. In that regard, we have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. For that reason, we reiterate our call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular the so-called nuclear-weapon States, to sign that important Treaty, because the best way to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is by guaranteeing their total prohibition by all State and non-State actors.

Bolivia once again calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop and dismantle its programme for the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, with the ultimate goal of achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula.

The year 2017 was one of the most intense years in the Security Council regarding the issue of non-proliferation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. After the nuclear test in September of that year and multiple ballistic missile tests, the Security Council unanimously adopted three resolutions, which not only imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on that country but also expressed the prevailing need for peaceful solutions to the conflict on the Korean peninsula. In that context, we consider that the imposition of sanctions is fulfilling part of its objectives to create opportunities to bring the parties to the negotiating table in order to

resume the dialogue to reach a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution that leads to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Bolivia reiterates its commitment to comply with those resolutions and all resolutions issued by this organ.

Since the beginning of 2018, and thanks to the political will of the different parties involved, the situation in the Korean peninsula has undergone positive changes. Bolivia, as a pacifist state, promoter of the culture of dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes, welcomes the strengthening of the inter-Korean dialogue, which so far this year has already had three high-level meetings between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un. The result of those meetings, which were based on sincere dialogue based on mutual respect, were very remarkable. For example, the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, which calls to suspend all hostile acts in all areas, is a very powerful manifestation of the will of the parties in building mutual trust and in strengthening relations that seek peace, harmony and prosperity.

We must point out that those conversations had more concrete results, such as the halting of ballistic missile tests, the dismantling of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site and the reunification of families separated for more than 60 years as a result of conflict, among others. More recently, at the Pyongyang summit, they agreed to permanently dismantle the Tongchang-ri ballistic missile engine and launch-test site, and the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. That opened up the possibility of a fourth meeting between both leaders in the city of Seoul, which would be quite an event and a clear sign of the strengthening of mutual trust.

We highlight the holding of the summit between the Chairman of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the President of the United States last June in Singapore. I reiterate that such rapprochement should serve to build mutual trust between the parties with the ultimate goal of achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and building a lasting and stable peace regime, to which the suspension of military exercises will contribute.

With regard to sanctions, we insist that they should not be an end in themselves; in that respect, we express our concern about the possible adverse effect that they could have on the population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Any action by the Council must not diminish the living conditions of local populations, while highlighting the important work done by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and facilitating exceptions for the importation of products for humanitarian purposes. Likewise, we reiterate our rejection of any unilateral action and any type of imposition of unilateral sanctions.

In conclusion, we emphasize again that there is no military solution to this conflict; only a diplomatic solution based on dialogue and consultations will allow us to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and allow us to build a sustainable peace regime in that region.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

Ms. Kang (Republic of Korea): I thank you very much, Mr. President, for convening this meeting and for the opportunity to speak to the Security Council.

As you state, Mr. President, we are indeed at the dawn of a new day with regard to the challenge of North Korea's denuclearization. It is useful to take a step back and to realize just how new a day it is. Barely a year ago here in the Council, we were counting the numbers of North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches and calling for united action to bring North Korea to the right side of history. At the time, the thought of President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un shaking hands and holding a summit would have been considered a daydream. It would have been a fantasy to imagine President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong Un on top of Mount Paekdu taking photos together. But here we are, and we have a different set of numbers to ponder: three inter-Korean summits and the first-ever United States-North Korea summit in a matter of five months, with more likely to follow in the months to come.

Allow me to quickly recap the milestone developments on the Korean peninsula that have brought us to this point. They started with North Korea's participation in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, in February and March, to which the North Korean leader sent a high-level delegation. That was quickly followed by the visit of President Moon Jae-in's special envoy to Pyongyang in early March, who came back with first-hand confirmation of Chairman Kim's intentions on denuclearization.

In April, North Korea took a step forward by announcing that it would discontinue nuclear tests as well as ballistic missile tests of intercontinental range. It also announced that it would dismantle its nuclear test site, which it did a month later. On 27 April, the two Koreas held an inter-Korean summit — the first in more than a decade. In the outcome, the Panmunjom Declaration, the two sides agreed to actively cooperate for the establishment of a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula through complete denuclearization.

At the first-ever United States-North Korea summit, on 12 June, the top leaders of the two countries also confirmed the common goal of building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and the North Korean leader reaffirmed his commitment to complete denuclearization.

Last week, President Moon Jae-in visited Pyongyang for his third summit meeting with Chairman Kim. They discussed at length the denuclearization challenge, including concrete ways to bring it about. For the first time in his own voice, the North Korean leader stated his commitment to turn the Korean peninsula into a land of peace, free of nuclear weapons and threat — and that at a joint press conference with President Moon Jae-in, which was broadcast live to the rest of the world.

More specifically, in the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, North Korea announced that it will permanently dismantle its Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries, and indicated its willingness to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures. Hopes are now high that the upcoming United States-North Korea negotiations will produce more concrete outcomes.

The international community has been able to bring North Korea back to the dialogue through a well-measured combination of diplomatic tools. In particular, the Security Council played a critical role. The Council unanimously adopted a series of sanctions in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations, and the international community acted unity in fully implementing them, thereby sending a clear message to North Korea that the pursuit of its nuclear weapons programme will never be accepted. But at the same time, the door for dialogue was kept open to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. Eventually, the will of the international community prevailed, and North Korea changed course and came to the path of dialogue and peaceful resolution. In the past few months, it has taken a series of "for the first-time" actions that were unthinkable only a year ago.

As for the Government of the Republic of Korea, we are committed to continuing to work with the international community to ensure that the Council's sanctions are implemented faithfully, even as we continue to engage North Korea to facilitate substantial progress towards complete denuclearization. We are also furthering inter-Korean dialogue to solidify the momentum for reconciliation and better relations. That includes implementing the comprehensive military agreement signed in Pyongyang, which aims to eliminate the threat of war and prevent accidental clashes.

Last week, while in North Korea, many of us joined President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim on their visit to Mount Paekdu. As the highest point on the Korean peninsula, that mountain bears a very special meaning for all Koreans. The microclimate of Mount Paekdu makes the weather very unpredictable — sunny and clear one moment, but foggy and drizzly the next. We were there in stunningly clear sunny and clear weather. But that was probably the exception rather than the norm. Our path to the complete denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula might prove likewise — uneasy periods of uncertainty and weariness interspersed with moments of a step change in progress and clear visibility towards our goal.

But, in the longer scheme of things, comparing where we were a year ago and where we are today, the situation has definitively become clearer and visibility has been greatly enhanced. The change has been possible because of bold, far-sighted and determined leadership, much of which has rested on you, Secretary Pompeo, and the unity of the international community. As long as we stay this course, I am confident that the months ahead will take us even closer to our shared goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula that is permanently at peace.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Mr. Kono (Japan): I would first like to extend my sincere gratitude to you, Secretary Pompeo, for your

tireless efforts on North Korean issues. You have not only brought this meeting together to reaffirm our collective determination to tackle these pressing issues, but you have also been selflessly dedicated to achieving the complete denuclearization of North Korea for the good of us all. I would also like to pay tribute to my counterpart from the Republic of Korea, Minister Kang, for her leadership and hard work.

Japan welcomes and supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts, including the historic United States-North Korea summit held in Singapore in June, as well as the three inter-Korean summits held this year, as a step towards reaching a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues involving North Korea. It is my greatest hope that those efforts will lead to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea, which is a common goal that we all share in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Japan will spare no effort to realize that goal.

Nevertheless, we are acutely aware that the most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency expressed grave concern that North Korea is continuing its nuclear programme. What we seek is for North Korea to seize this unprecedented opportunity and take decisive and irreversible steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. The international community should come together to assist the diplomatic efforts that are under way and encourage North Korea to make a strategic decision to fulfil its international obligations and commitments. In doing so, it is critical for us to remain united so as to ensure the full implementation of the relevant resolutions that the Council has unanimously adopted. I am convinced that there is no better way for us to support the current diplomatic process.

We should also be aware of several important incidents. The Government of Japan shares the view of the United States Government and some other partner countries that the 2018 annual cap for petroleum products has already been breached. It is important that all Member States immediately stop supplying those products to North Korea, pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions. There are also continued reports of increasingly sophisticated efforts to evade and circumvent measures based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, including through what are known as ship-to-ship transfers and the selling of fishing rights. The very authority of the decisions made by the Council is at stake. It is our obligation to stop sanction-evasion activities.

Last but not least, between Japan and North Korea lie issues that must be resolved immediately. Japan is determined to directly engage with North Korea and use every possible means at our disposal towards achieving the immediate resolution of the issues. North Korea is blessed with great potential and is well placed to shape a brighter future for itself if it takes the right path. North Korea enjoys an abundance of resources and a hardworking labour force. This is an important moment, and I strongly urge North Korea to seize this unique opportunity. Only North Korea that can make that happen. In order to achieve lasting peace and stability in North-East Asia and beyond, while protecting the current international non-proliferation regime, it is absolutely imperative to realize the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea. To that end, let us unite in renewing our clear and unwavering commitment to the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The President: Before adjourning this last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of September, on behalf of the United States, Ambassador Haley and our entire delegation here in New York, I would like to express our sincere appreciation to the members of the Council, the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff, the Secretariat's staff, the interpreters, the recorders and security for the excellent assistance they have provided during this very busy but highly productive month. We also greatly appreciate members' support of our goal of transparency during this month, while keeping our briefings and discussions open and available to the world to see and hear.

Ultimately, the Council is accountable to every citizen in the international community as we strive to foster stability, maintain security and preserve peace across the world. Our open proceedings will allow history to judge us fairly and truthfully and, we hope, with an understanding of the sincerity of our endeavours here. I therefore thank everyone once again. As we end our presidency, I wish the delegation of Bolivia good luck for the month of October.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8364

Security Council

Seventy-third year

Provisional

8364th meeting
Wednesday, 3 October 2018, 9.30 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Llorentty Solíz	(Bolivia (Plurinational State of))
Members:	China	Mr. Wu Haitao
	Côte d'Ivoire	Mr. Ipo
	Equatorial Guinea	Mrs. Mele Colifa
	Ethiopia	Mr. Amde
	France	Mr. Melki
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Umarov
	Kuwait	Mr. Alotaibi
	Netherlands	Mr. Van Oosterom
	Peru	Mr. Meza-Cuadra
	Poland	Ms. Wronecka
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	Sweden	Mr. Vaverka
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Allen
	United States of America	Mr. Cohen

Agenda

Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

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The meeting was called to order at 9.35 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the outgoing President

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of October, I should like to take this opportunity to pay sincere tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Her Excellency Mrs. Nikki Haley, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the United States of America, for her service as President of the Council for the month of September. I am sure that I speak for all the members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Haley and her delegation for the excellent diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month.

Expression of sympathy for the victims of the earthquake and tsunami in Sulawesi, Indonesia

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of the Council, I would like to remember all those who lost their lives on Friday in the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck Sulawesi, Indonesia. The members of the Council offer our deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims, as well as to the people and the Government of Indonesia.

I request members to stand and observe a minute of silence in solemn memory of those who lost their lives in that natural disaster.

The members of the Council observed a minute of silence.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

At the outset, I will make a joint statement on behalf of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). Following that joint statement, the Council will hear briefings by the Chairs of those three Committees.

I shall now make a joint statement on behalf of the 1267, 1373 and 1540 Committees.

On behalf of the Chairs of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), I have the honour to brief the Security Council on the work of the three Committees, including the ongoing cooperation between the three Committees and their respective Groups of Experts.

The three Committees carry out their work in a strategic context in which the global security landscape has become significantly more complex, volatile and challenging. Terrorism continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Terrorists, terrorist organizations and their affiliates and cells continue to adapt their tactics and methods, including by using modern means of communication to recruit followers, finance, plan and execute attacks against soft targets, and incite the commission of such acts.

Returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters pose new threats and challenges to their countries of origin and nationality and third countries. Globalization, rapid advances in science and technology and the continuously evolving trading environment bring not only great benefits, but also new risks, including with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The three Committees highlight the importance of bearing in mind the potentially devastating effects that nuclear, chemical or biological weapons could exert in the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists.

The three Committees are aware that terrorist groups and their supporters are ready to commit extreme violence on a wide scale, which could have catastrophic humanitarian, economic, social and political consequences. The three Committees and their respective Groups of Experts strive, within the limits of their respective mandates, to promote the most updated and effective measures based on human rights, the rule of law and gender issues in the areas of non-proliferation, sanctions, countering the financing of terrorism, border management and law enforcement, international judicial cooperation, prosecution,

rehabilitation and reintegration, countering terrorist narratives and engaging communities.

In the light of that broad spectrum of measures, the three subsidiary bodies continue to attach great importance to coordination and cooperation among their respective Groups of Experts, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolutions 1526 (2004); the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED); and the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The three Committees are maintaining their efforts to enhance information-sharing through joint meetings and encourage their associated Groups of Experts to further step up their cooperation.

Pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017), the 1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) have undertaken a series of coordinated and more targeted outreach activities. The Committees convened a joint briefing on Central Asia on 2 July.

The three Committees continue to believe that those coordinated activities are very important tools for strengthening their dialogue with Member States, for helping to improve the overall understanding of their distinct yet complementary mandates, and for assisting Member States in implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The expert bodies associated with the three Committees continue to cooperate closely in working with Member States by exchanging information, coordinating visits in the context of their respective mandates, when appropriate, and facilitating and monitoring the technical assistance provided to Member States to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. In that context, I would like to highlight that the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) participated in two joint visits to Armenia and to Georgia in July. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) participated in the Executive Directorate's visit to Ethiopia and to the Niger in July and will also take part in the visit to Mali in October. This month, the Monitoring Team and the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) will participate in a joint workshop to be held in Zimbabwe to support capacity-building activities in the areas of countering the financing of terrorism and proliferation.

The three Committees have maintained close cooperation with the United Nations counter-terrorism bodies. On 28 September 2017, the Chairs of the 1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee addressed the Council, together with the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Officer-in-Charge of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, at a briefing on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" (see S/PV.8059). On 28 June, the Chairs of the 1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee addressed the United Nations High-level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States, convened by the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team continue to work closely in drafting the Secretary-General's reports on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

The three expert bodies continue to work with and reach out to various international and regional organizations of common interest in order to explore ways to further enhance the implementation of their respective mandates in a coordinated and complementary way. The three expert bodies continue to participate in platforms of common interest, such as the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and its working groups and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team took part in missions on an in-depth review of the Advance Passenger Information System and will do the same with regard to passenger name records.

The Executive Directorate also acts as the FATF focal point for the United Nations expert bodies based in New York and coordinates the preparation of reports on joint activities three times a year, which are presented at each FATF plenary. The Executive Directorate also plans and coordinates annual meetings between the FATF secretariat and the expert bodies in New York. The Executive Directorate is a United Nations focal point for the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and collects relevant information from the other United Nations entities, such as the 1267 Monitoring Team and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), in order to draft and to present a United Nations observer report to the Asia/Pacific Group annually. The Executive Directorate

actively facilitated the dialogue between the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and the Monitoring Team, which resulted in granting the Monitoring Team observer status within the Eurasian Group in May.

When two or more groups participate in the same event, particularly the FATF and FATF-style regional body plenary meetings, they usually exchange information. In May 2017, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate involved the Monitoring Team in a regional workshop on counter-terrorism financing, held jointly by the Eurasian Group International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring and the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Center. The Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team jointly contributed to the United Nations inputs into the final declaration of the conference on combating the financing of Da'esh and Al-Qaida, held in Paris in April.

The three expert bodies continue to hold regular informal meetings. The Counter-Terrorism Committee also regularly invites the other two expert bodies to its thematic briefings and official meetings. The Committee invited the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities to take part in joint open briefings, such as that on challenges in countering terrorism in West Africa and that held together with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya on challenges in countering terrorism in Libya, both of which took place in June 2017. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism Committee invited the other two Committee expert bodies to its briefings on the role of financial institutions in combating terrorism, in October 2017, and on virtual currencies and the misuse of new technologies to finance terrorism, in December 2017.

In its presidential statement S/PRST/2018/9 of 8 May, the Security Council requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), and the Committee pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) to hold a special joint meeting within 12 months on addressing the issue of the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime. The expert bodies also shared their up-to-date expertise and experience at a number of internal thematic professional training activities and briefings by external partners and interlocutors.

The three Committees and their respective expert bodies will continue to cooperate and to coordinate their work in line with their respective mandates, with a view to ensuring an effective and efficient approach to countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by and to non-State actors. The three Committees reaffirm their continued engagement in supporting Member States in those global efforts. The Chairs of the three Committee are committed to meeting on a regular basis, at least twice a year, to improve coordination and to discuss the main priority areas for possible joint actions. The three Committees look forward to receiving further guidance from the Security Council on areas of common interest and to further strengthening their joint activities.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Since this is the first official meeting under your presidency, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate Bolivia on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October and to wish you successful work. Likewise, we would like to commend the United States delegation for its very capable stewardship of the work of the Security Council during the month of September.

On behalf of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, I would like to give a brief overview of developments in the work of the Committee, as requested in paragraph 46 of resolution 2368 (2017).

Since the previous joint briefing to the Council in May 2017 (see S/PV.7936), the Committee has continued to devote special focus to the evolving threat to international peace and security posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Al-Qaida and affiliates. The response to the threat must be comprehensive and coordinated, and employ a range of

tools. The 1267 sanctions regime is an important part of the toolbox and the Committee stays engaged with Member States to ensure its effective implementation.

According to the latest report (see S/2018/705) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the threat posed by ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and affiliates has further evolved over the past year. Despite having been defeated militarily in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2017, ISIL rallied in early 2018 and still controls small pockets of territory in Syria. The group was able to extract some oil and to mount attacks, including across the Iraqi border.

Meanwhile, Al-Qaida remains resilient in the Syrian Arab Republic, where the Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant may now be the strongest terrorist group. Al-Qaida and its affiliates are stronger than ISIL in Yemen, Somalia and parts of West Africa, while its alliance with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan is firm, despite rivalry from the local ISIL affiliate. The sustained coalition of terrorist groups in Mali and the Sahel is a source of concern and could supply a model for future cooperation and exchange among terrorists in other regions.

As of June, the strength of ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic is assessed to be between 20,000 and 30,000 members, roughly equally distributed between the two countries. Foreign terrorist fighters represent a significant component of the group. Returnees and relocating fighters pose a threat in several regions, including Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Central Asia and North Africa. Therefore, enhanced information-sharing among Member States is required.

At the same time, in Afghanistan ISIL is estimated to number between 3,500 and 4,000 fighters. The group is trying to expand its presence, despite pressure from the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and the international coalition. Against that background, neighbouring countries have expressed concern over the ongoing terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and increasing numbers of ISIL fighters relocating to Afghanistan from Syria and Iraq.

The evolving threat is also reflected in the adoption of a number of new resolutions by the Council that have expanded the work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team. In July 2017, the Council adopted resolution 2368 (2017) to renew the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo affecting all individuals and entities on the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list. In the same resolution, the Council extended the mandates of the Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson until 17 December 2021.

In resolution 2379 (2017) of September 2017, the Council requested the creation of an investigative team, headed by a special adviser, to support domestic efforts or investigations carried out by authorities in third countries, at their request, in order to hold ISIL accountable for acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group in Iraq. The Council further requested the Investigative Team to cooperate with the Monitoring Team and with any other relevant monitoring bodies. I met with the Special Adviser, Mr. Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, to discuss ways in which the Committee can assist the Investigative Team with its mandate.

In resolution 2388 (2017), adopted in November 2017, the Council reiterated its condemnation of all acts of trafficking, particularly the sale or trade in persons undertaken by ISIL, and underscored the importance of collecting and preserving evidence relating to such acts in order to ensure that those responsible can be held accountable. The Council also requested the Monitoring Team to continue including in its discussions the issue of trafficking in persons in areas of armed conflict and the use of sexual violence in armed conflict, as it relates to ISIL and Al-Qaida, and to report to the 1267 (1999) Committee on those discussions, as appropriate.

On 21 December 2017, the Security Council adopted resolution 2396 (2017), which underscored the threat posed by returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, created new obligations for Member States to help detect terrorists' travels and directed the Committee to devote special focus on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters.

For all of those resolutions, it is crucial that Member States engage with and provide updated information to the Committee and the Monitoring Team on the evolving nature of the threat, including foreign terrorist fighters, listed individuals and entities, and the status of the implementation of the sanctions measures. In order to enhance the full and effective implementation of the sanctions, the Committee also undertakes visits to selected countries.

In that context, in my capacity as Chair of both the 1267 Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), I visited

Afghanistan last year on 29 and 30 October. I was accompanied by representatives from the Committee and the Monitoring Team. The visit was facilitated by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan with the objective of obtaining first-hand accounts regarding the implementation and effectiveness of sanctions measures, and to promote enhanced dialogue and the engagement of Afghan interlocutors with the Committees. I also conducted visits to Singapore and Malaysia in August 2017 and to the Philippines in March this year to exchange information on the ISIL threat in the region, as well as to explore how the sanctions regime can support the South-East Asian countries dealing with ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates.

The Committee maintains its sanctions list, updated to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions measures. Since the last joint briefing in May 2017, 13 individuals and 7 entities have been listed. Five individuals have been delisted. The Committee approved amendments to the existing list entries of 16 individuals and 6 entities. As of today, there are 263 individuals and 82 entities on the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list. Since the last joint briefing to the Council, the Committee has decided to delist three individuals and retain three individuals on the basis of reports submitted by the Ombudsperson. Currently, three requests for delisting are pending with the Office of the Ombudsperson; two cases are in the information-gathering period and one case is being discussed.

The Committee welcomes the fact that Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati has recently taken up his duties as Ombudsperson of the ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. The Committee looks forward to cooperating with the Ombudsperson, considering the important role of his Office.

In the reporting period, I held two briefings to interested Member States, on 17 October 2017 and on 2 August 2018, respectively. The last briefing was a joint event for both the 1267 and the 1988 Committees. I encourage Member States that are not members of the Security Council to share any queries and concerns with the Committee, the Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson.

I would like to take this opportunity to call upon Member States to continue their engagement with the Committee and the Monitoring Team, as this is essential to maintaining an up-to-date and dynamic sanctions list and fundamental to effective cooperation with the sanctions regime. In that regard, I would like to note that the Committee is conducting its annual review for 2017. The purpose of that exercise is to keep the sanctions list updated by reviewing the names of individuals and entities that lack identifiers, individuals who are reportedly deceased and entities that are reportedly defunct, as well as any other names that have not been reviewed in three or more years. I thank the Member States that have provided information, as it has proven challenging to obtain responses from all relevant Member States.

In addition to the regular reviews, the Monitoring Team updates list entries based on information provided by Member States. We encourage Member States to keep the Team informed. I also urge those Member States that have not done so to submit the implementation reports mandated under the relevant resolutions.

As Chair, I would like to thank all Member States for their cooperation with the Committee, its Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Umarov for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra of Peru, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism.

Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, and Bolivia on assuming the presidency of the Security Council. I also want to thank Ambassador Nikki Haley and her team for the exceptional guiding of our work for the month of September.

(*spoke in English*)

I thank you, Mr. President for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate (CTED).

Terrorist groups, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaida and their affiliates, continue to pose a grave threat to peace and security around the world. ISIL has suffered significant losses, but has transformed itself into a global network that continues to motivate its supporters and followers around the globe to commit attacks. The growing sophistication of the methods used by terrorists requires

innovation in our responses, while ensuring that those in place are both effective and sustainable.

Not long ago, we were concerned with the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. Our concerns now include not only the activities of those foreign terrorist fighters who remain in the conflict zones, but also returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their family members and the potential risk posed by the forthcoming release of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters and other persons convicted on terrorism-related charges. In this regard, the Committee is currently preparing a special meeting to update its 2015 Madrid guiding principles on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

Pursuant to resolution 2396 (2017), CTED is engaging with Member States, in cooperation with the relevant organizations, including the International Civil Aviation Organization, to assist with the implementation of the Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record systems and the use of biometric data to identify terrorists, in compliance with domestic law and international human rights law. I would note in connection with this the recent issuance of the United Nations compendium of recommended practices for the responsible use and sharing of biometrics in counter-terrorism, developed by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

CTED is also supporting the development of comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for former members of terrorist groups, including in the Lake Chad basin. Similarly, the Committee and CTED continue to focus on the main evidentiary and jurisdictional challenges that hinder attempts to prosecute returning foreign terrorist fighters.

Since our previous briefing (see S/PV.8127), the Council has also adopted resolution 2395 (2017), which renews the mandate of CTED and reaffirms its role as a special political mission acting under the policy guidance of the Committee. Pursuant to the same resolution, CTED has reported to the Committee on ways to strengthen its assessment tools and improve the utility of its assessment to Member States, technical assistance providers, implementing partners, the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), other relevant agencies, and international and regional organizations. Since the beginning of 2018, CTED has concluded 13 country-assessment visits on the Committee's behalf, in cooperation with international and regional organizations. I wish to note that the Committee recently obtained consent to visit Mali and Saudi Arabia, and that Finland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have invited assessment visits for 2019.

We are concerned about the impact of terrorism on children and on the role played within terrorist groups by women. While women are often victims of terrorism, they also can be perpetrators and facilitators. In June, the Committee held a briefing on children and terrorism, with the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and representatives of United Nations University. In the same vein, in September the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNOCT joined the Committee for a briefing on the human right aspects of counter-terrorism, including the rights of victims and survivors. Human rights and gender issues have also been streamlined throughout all Committee and CTED activities, including within the framework of assessment visits and thematic briefings.

As Council members are aware, cooperation with and among international and regional organizations and among the relevant United Nations entities is essential. In March, CTED organized a subregional consultation with the Governments of Afghanistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka on promoting the adoption and implementation of national strategies to counter violent extremism. Last July, the Committee held an open briefing on Central Asia, focusing on the current counter-terrorism situation in the region, the progress achieved by the five States of the region and the remaining challenges. Just last week, CTED, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Association of Prosecutors jointly launched a practical guide for requesting electronic evidence across borders for investigators, prosecutors and central authorities.

CTED also continues to promote and facilitate cooperation with other major actors and partners in the private sector, civil society and the research community, including through the CTED Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network. Participants in the Asia Information and Communications Technology and Counter-Terrorism Dialogue have discussed counter-terrorism, countering incitement and violent extremism leading to terrorism, the development of counter-narratives, enhancing the practice of private online communications, service providers and empowering online communities. In this regard, in May the Committee held an open meeting on

countering terrorist narratives and preventing terrorist use of the Internet.

Countering terrorist financing also continues to be a major focus of our attention. The CTED Executive Director notably played an active role in the No Money For Terror international conference, held in Paris in April. Pursuant to resolutions 2331 (2016) and 2388 (2017), CTED continues to investigate the possible links between transnational organized crime and terrorism, particularly human trafficking and terrorism. In cooperation with UNODC and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the Committee will hold an open briefing on the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime in October, and will also hold a joint special meeting on this topic, in accordance with the statement by the President of the Security Council of May 2018 (S/PRST/2018/9).

Acting under the guidance of the Committee and in accordance with resolution 2395 (2017), CTED has also continued to strengthen its cooperation with the Office of Counter Terrorism. A joint CTED/UNOCT report on enhanced coordination and cooperation was issued as a Security Council document (S/2018/435) and as an addendum to the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly on the biennial review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/72/840, annex IV). Moreover, CTED and UNOCT have conducted joint high-level consultations with Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Continued efforts have also been made to match the activities of UNOCT with a technical assistance need and recommendations set forth in the Committee visit reports.

In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm the determination of the Committee and CTED to develop and implement comprehensive responses to the evolving terrorism threat, in close cooperation with other relevant United Nations entities and with our international and regional partners.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Meza-Cuadra for his briefing.

I shall now provide a briefing in my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

(*spoke in English*)

On behalf of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), I am pleased to report on the progress made since our last report, in April 2018. We fully endorse the joint statement delivered on behalf of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as well as of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1540 Committee.

The key concern for the 1540 Committee is preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials to non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes. While the mandates of the three committees differ, there are important areas of complementarity. Cooperation among the three committees and their supporting experts is important to promoting the effective implementation by States of their obligations under the respective Security Council resolutions.

However, the 1540 Committee continues to be concerned by the potentially devastating effects and catastrophic consequences of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons proliferation by and to non-State actors, and the use of such weapons for terrorist purposes. Given the global nature of the challenges posed by the proliferation of the capabilities and technologies that can be used by non-State actors for weapons of mass destruction programmes, no State is exempt from making every effort to prevent such proliferation from happening. The obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) are designed precisely for that purpose.

The full and effective implementation of obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) involves a wide range of activities beyond the requisite adoption and enforcement of measures to prohibit non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. In that sense, I am pleased to report that the overwhelming majority of States have demonstrated their commitment to resolution 1540 (2004), and through their reporting to the 1540 Committee have provided valuable information on the measures they have taken, or plan to take, to comply with their obligations under the resolution. It is worthy of note that to date 181

countries — more than 90 per cent of all United Nations Member States — have submitted initial reports. To that end, two experts will be assisting Mali in preparing its initial report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) during an upcoming visit this month. Regular additional reporting and updating are also important so that the status of implementation can be reflected and assessed accurately.

While reporting is important, what also matters is the effectiveness of the practical steps taken at the national level to implement the resolution 1540 (2004). One helpful step in that regard is for States to develop voluntary national implementation action plans as encouraged by paragraph 5 of resolution 2325 (2016). In the implementation of such action plans, and in order for the process to work, all key national stakeholders must be engaged with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The voluntary national implementation action plans also help to identify actions to close any gaps and vulnerabilities in legislation, regulation and national control frameworks, and to identify areas where assistance may be required.

Exchanges and the sharing of information by Member States are among the Committee's core activities. The Member States are in the best position to identify effective national practices and to share them with the 1540 Committee and other partners. As one example, the Committee had an opportunity to hear about the peer review meetings between Chile and Colombia, held in each country in 2017, in relation to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). That was the third peer review to take place globally and the first in the western hemisphere. The discussions highlighted the value of the peer review process for promoting Member States' confidence in sharing information about the challenges of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and generating ideas about effective national implementation practices.

The 1540 Committee recognizes the key role of the 1540 national points of contact in support of the resolution's implementation. The Committee has developed regional training courses for national points of contact, including the most recent ones in Addis Ababa for French-speaking African States, hosted by the African Union, and in Rostov-on-Don, with the support of the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The regional national points of contact training courses, not only aim to enhance the capacity and coordination role of points of contact, but also seek to create a living network of points of contact to strengthen cooperation and coordination with the Committee and among points of contact in the respective regions.

One of the priority areas the committee is focused on is improving the system of assistance to facilitate Member States' capacity to implement their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). In particular, the Committee seeks to match assistance requests from States with offers from States or international, regional or subregional organizations in a position to provide assistance. By doing so, an assisting State or organization can respond effectively to requests for assistance. Pending assistance requests are displayed on the home page of the 1540 Committee website and date back to 2010. As of today, 21 assistance requests are still open and further assistance is needed. The 1540 Committee website also includes lists of States and international, regional and subregional organizations that have offered assistance in general.

As of 30 May, 47 States and 16 organizations had informed the Committee about general assistance programmes that could help facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Assistance providers are always welcome to update the Committee about their assistance programmes. The Committee stands ready to add to its website new programmes or information on available assistance.

The Committee and its Group of Experts have maintained the momentum of outreach events in the course of fulfilling the Committee's programme of work. A top priority is direct engagement with States through visits and national round tables, at their invitation. In the course of that process, increased use has been made of the support that can be offered by regional organizations, including the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and its regional centres.

We have also intensified our engagement with international organizations whose mandates are directly related to resolution 1540 (2004), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, as well as those bodies that support related committees, such as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. I would like to acknowledge the cooperation between

the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts and these international organizations.

Transparency and outreach are vital to the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). With that in mind, the Committee is seeking ways to make better use of its website. For example, we have continued to publish a quarterly message from the Chair that goes out to the wider 1540 network, including civil society. A special effort is being made to engage parliamentarians through, for example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). In that regard, I will have the honour to deliver a video message to an upcoming meeting of the IPU.

I should stress that the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is the responsibility of States. However, effective implementation is more than simply ensuring that legislation or regulations are in place. Among other things, it also requires active engagement between the State and relevant sectors of society, including industry, academia and professional associations. An effective partnership between States and industry is also vital to successful non-proliferation efforts. The Wiesbaden process conferences foster such a dialogue between States and industry.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight that the spirit of cooperation and dialogue with the Member States continues to inform the 1540 Committee's activities.

(*spoken in Spanish*)

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

Mr. Cohen (United States of America): Let us first congratulate Bolivia on assuming the presidency of the Security Council. We wish you every success in the month ahead, Mr. President. Let me also thank the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) for the strong cooperation of their committees and Groups of Experts.

We have come a long way at the United Nations in helping to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. But ISIS is evolving, moving away from being an overt organization to being a networked covert organization cultivating growing numbers of affiliates around the world. This year the 1267 Committee designated ISIS facilitators in South-East Asia and an ISIS leader in the Sahel, among others. Such affiliates can bring the scourge of ISIS to new hotspots. It is important that the 1267 Committee expeditiously designate ISIS affiliates to prevent them from taking up the mantle of a diminished ISIS core. We welcome the appointment of Daniel Kipfer Fasciati as the new Ombudsperson for the 1267 Committee and look forward to working with him.

The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is increasingly relevant today. This year has seen the devastating consequences of chemical-weapons use by State and non-State actors in Syria and the United Kingdom, and last year we witnessed a horrific murder in Malaysia by VX. We collectively cannot allow the international norm against the use of such dangerous weapons to break down, especially when non-State actors are becoming increasingly violent and desirous of obtaining WMDs.

The three Committees and other relevant parts of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT), must work together more closely to better synchronize their activities and cut down on duplication. Last year we updated the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to strengthen coordination between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the General Assembly counter-terrorism bodies on counter-terrorism issues. In response, CTED and the OCT released a joint report (S/2018/435, annex) setting out practical steps to ensure the incorporation of CTED's recommendations and analysis into the work of the OCT. The report is a model to improve cooperation and ensure that expert country assessments define United Nations counter-terrorism technical assistance. Given the diverse threats we face around the world, ongoing collaboration and information-sharing between the Committee's expert bodies remain integral to minimizing overlap and ensuring accurate threat assessments that lead to action.

The Secretariat and many Member States often do not have the localized knowledge necessary for adequately addressing the terrorist threat in all parts of the world. That is why we continue to advocate for a whole-of-society approach, meaning stronger

engagement with civil society and non-governmental organizations. Working with both United Nations and non-United Nations actors, including non-governmental organizations and civil society actors, helps the United Nations and Member States leverage the full array of expertise and perspectives needed to better identify and address fast-changing and diverse terrorist threats. Our counter-terrorism Committees must ensure that our counter-terrorism analysis and efforts are not counterproductive to our international commitments to human rights and to the rule of law. Enhancing Committee engagement with human rights bodies is a step in the right direction.

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): Let me to congratulate you, Sir, on your country's presidency of the Security Council. We wish you and your team good luck. You can count on our full support for your work in the weeks ahead. Let me also thank Ambassador Nikki Haley and Ambassador Jonathan Cohen and their teams for their excellent and transparent stewardship of the Council over the past — and may I say, rather hectic — month.

We last met in August to discuss counter-terrorism (see S/PV.8330). It was then that I stressed that the terrorist threat had changed but had not diminished. That was proved once again last week in my country, when authorities foiled a major terrorist attack. Seven men were arrested. They had planned to carry out a terrorist attack that would claim the lives of as many victims as possible at a large event in the Netherlands. In our view, that incident underlines that we cannot be complacent. We cannot let our guard down. In that light, we welcome our discussion today.

I would like to thank Ambassador Llorentty Soliz, Ambassador Umarov and Ambassador Meza-Cuadra for their briefings and excellent work as the Chairs of the Committees. I believe that all of us in the Council acknowledge the special responsibilities and the additional workload of the Chairs involved. We appreciate their important work to counter terrorism and commend the efforts of their teams.

I would like to focus on three issues in my intervention: implementation, transparency and accountability.

First, with regard to implementation, resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) are the foundation of the Council's work on countering terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The Council has built on that foundation by adopting various subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 2396 (2017), on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters. One could look at those resolutions and compare them to the structure of a house with several rooms. Together with the foundation and structure, the rooms are part of a sturdy, solid house. But for the house to weather heavy storms, maintenance is crucial. Therefore, implementing the resolutions is key. The work of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) 1540 (2004) and their expert bodies is indispensable in that regard. However, the success of their work depends on us — all the States Members of the United Nations. We must take responsibility in fulfilling the Commitments prescribed by the resolutions. It is for that reason that last week my Prime Minister handed over a full operational Passenger Name Record (PNR) system to Secretary-General Guterres. The system was developed in the Netherlands and can now be used by the United Nations to support Member States in meeting their PNR obligations, as stipulated in resolution 2396 (2017). To that end, we call upon Member States to join us and others in financing the United Nations PNR outreach project.

Secondly, on the issue of transparency — if the Council will allow, I will continue with my metaphor — there is no use building a house with rooms if the doors in those rooms stay closed. The three Committees and their expert bodies, which we are discussing today, have to be transparent. The doors must be open. We therefore encourage the Chairs of the Committees and the experts to continue their joint briefings, travel and workshops. We encourage them to share more information with other parts of the United Nations, such as the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria and the United Nations Investigative Team for the Accountability of Da'esh. We also encourage them to open the front door and intensify their outreach to non-Council members and non-United Nations organizations. In that context, let me mention the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which met here in New York last week. The Forum has two co-Chairs, Morocco and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It is our joint ambition, as co-Chairs, to work as closely as possible with the United Nations.

Lastly, with regard to accountability, as in any house, some rooms are used more frequently, and therefore require more maintenance than others. In the complex fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, we have to establish priorities. Accountability should be the overarching driver of our efforts. Terrorists should be held accountable for the atrocities they commit, in particular war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In particular, we need accountability for the mass atrocities committed by the fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham. The security of our societies and the dignity of the victims depend on it. That also applies in particular to sexual violence in conflict, and we welcome the statement just made by our Kazakh colleague on that important aspect.

In conclusion, the counter-terrorism house we have built over the years is strong. But we cannot sit back and relax. We have to maintain our common house. And we have to be willing to renovate and expand, where necessary, to address new threats. The Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to roll up our sleeves, together with our landlords — the 1267, 1373 and 1540 Committees, their Chairs and expert bodies.

Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your presidency of the Security Council and wish your country's delegation all the best. I also thank the delegation of the United States for its presidency of the Council last month. I want as well to thank our colleagues the Chairs of the three Committees — the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan, Peru and Bolivia — for their detailed briefings on the activities of those Committees concerning counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. We also thank the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Committee concerning Da'esh and Al-Qaida, the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Office of the Ombudsperson for carrying out their activities in accordance with their respective mandates.

We commend the role played by the three Committees, including their cooperation with other relevant United Nations entities, such as United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization and other relevant United Nations entities, together with regional organizations, to combat terrorism and the proliferation of terrorist groups, as they pose a threat to international peace and security.

The State of Kuwait commends the efforts of the three Chairs, including their visits to Member States, joint briefings, comprehensive assessments and analytical work concerning emerging issues, trends and developments in supporting Member States and United Nations entities so that they can take the necessary measures under international law. All those activities are helpful to Member States and other subsidiary bodies.

We reaffirm what the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee said earlier with regard to the need to focus on women and children as victims of terrorist groups. In that regard, we note resolution 2396 (2017), which stressed the need to pay attention to women and children in those specific situations.

Pertaining to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), we commend the role played by the Committee and its Panel of Experts in helping countries to implement the provisions of that important resolution. We have witnessed the recent use of chemical weapons by States and non-State actors throughout the world. We therefore must recognize the urgent need to address that disaster through the implementation of the relevant international resolutions, especially resolution 1540 (2004). That would allow the international community to continue its strenuous efforts in order to prevent non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups, from developing, possessing, manufacturing, acquiring, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction in all their forms, whether nuclear, chemical or biological.

In conclusion, we would like to underscore that the State of Kuwait condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations regardless of its motives. Terrorism is a criminal act that cannot be justified and must not be associated with any religion, nationality, culture or ethnicity. In order to combat the criminal scourge of terrorism, we must combine international efforts and adopt the necessary measures to ensure respect for human rights, the rule of law, good governance and peaceful coexistence among religions, while respecting their symbols and holy places. In addition, conditions conducive to terrorism must be addressed along with rejecting hatred and all forms of extremism and violence. The State of Kuwait is firmly committed to working actively to effectively implement the relevant Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation.

Mr. Melki (France) (*spoke in French*): I join all those who thanked the United States for its able leadership of

the Security Council during September, which is always an exceptional month, and I congratulate Bolivia for its accession to the presidency of the Council for October and its very compact and relevant programme of work.

I would like to begin by thanking Ambassadors Meza-Cuadra, Umarov and Llorentty Soliz for their detailed briefings and committed leadership, respectively, of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999) and 1540. Terrorism and nuclear proliferation are today among the greatest threats to international peace and security. Let me touch briefly the activities of each Committee.

First, with regard to the 1267 Committee, which is responsible for sanctions against Da'esh and Al-Qaida, as its Chair pointed out, although Da'esh has suffered major military defeats, the group continues to pose a complex threat and inspire radicalized individuals to act. The end of its territorial control does not signify the end of the terrorist threat posed by Da'esh, but has only made it more diffuse, as has been pointed out more than once today. Its own autonomous capacities for producing and using chemical weapons have not vanished. Al-Qaida also remains very active in certain areas, such as the Sahel and the Arabian peninsula. In that regard, the 1267 Committee is carrying out two critical missions. First of all, it is analysing the terrorist threat through the reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which serve as valuable tools for Member States. France encourages all States to cooperate with the Team in strengthening its analyses. Secondly, concerning the implementation and rigorous monitoring of the sanctions list, which is the largest of all United Nations sanctions regimes, we encourage every State to continue to submit listing requests. For that regime to remain credible and effective, it is also essential that its procedures respect the basic freedoms of those on the list. France welcomes Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati, who assumed his functions as Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee this summer, and encourages all States to continue to cooperate with the Office of the Ombudsperson, whose work is critical for the sanctions regime.

My second point concerns the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which also carries out two major functions in complementarity. The first is to raise States' awareness of new trends characterizing the constantly evolving terrorist threat. The Committee's special meetings — for example, our meeting next week on the links between terrorism and organized crime — provide an excellent means for sharing information and reflecting on specific issues. The second function of the Counter-Terrorism Committee is to consider how States are implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions in the many areas that fall under its purview, namely, monitoring foreign terrorist fighters, countering the financing of terrorism and combating propaganda and incitement to commit terrorist acts. It is essential that States allow visits by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate so that it can audit their counter-terrorism systems and provide appropriate recommendations, particularly with regard to technical assistance. France also encourages pursuing joint meetings between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1267 Committee so as to address analysis on the terrorist threat and assess the implementation of Security Council resolutions.

Lastly, I would like to say a few words about the important work being done by the 1540 Committee under the chairmanship of Bolivia.

The risk that radiological, biological, chemical and nuclear materials and vectors fall into the hands of terrorists is, as I have said, a proven danger. We have seen it in Syria and Iraq, and it has been clearly established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that Da'esh has used yperite on at least two occasions in Syria. Added to that are the uncertainties that weigh on the comprehensiveness of the Syrian declaration on its chemical programme made to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, while the potential existence of residual capabilities on Syrian territory only increases those risks.

It is therefore more important than ever to adapt our efforts to the evolution of the threat. We are particularly concerned about transfers to the Middle East of goods and technologies related to vectors designed to be able to carry weapons of mass destruction. Progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions is tangible at the national and regional levels. The vast majority of United Nation States Members have now adopted measures incorporating the provisions of the resolution into their national legislation. Whether it concerns securing sensitive materials and goods, strengthening border controls or even, where necessary, establishing export-control mechanisms, the international community aims to ensure that such sensitive materials and assets cannot possibly fall into the hands of terrorists. The

adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) at the end of 2016 has made it possible to adapt and bolster our framework for action in countering the threat. By strengthening the approach to cooperation, assistance and interaction we will be able to better prevent the risk of weapons of mass destruction being acquired by non-State actors. France will remain fully involved in that effort, starting this month by submitting to the First Committee a draft resolution on preventing the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorists and by supporting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the European Union and in the course of its forthcoming chairmanship of the Group of Seven.

Mr. Ipo (Côte d'Ivoire) (*spoke in French*): My country would like to congratulate Bolivia on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October and wish it every success in the conduct of our work. My delegation would also like to express its deepest appreciation to the United States of America for the relevance of the issues discussed during its presidency in September.

Côte d'Ivoire welcomes this meeting to consider the joint report of the three subsidiary bodies that make up the Council's counter-terrorism framework. We thank Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999); Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001); and you yourself, Ambassador Sacha Llorentty Soliz, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), for the quality of the respective briefings.

The reports of the subsidiary bodies provide us with scope and extent of the evolving threat of terrorism, the security risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the work done by the various subsidiary bodies themselves. That analysis compels my delegation to comment on the evolution of the terrorism threat, the mandates of the Committees and the challenges to overcome.

With regard to the evolution of the threat of terrorism, my country remains concerned about new forms of terrorist threats enhanced by globalization; the resilience of Da'esh and its affiliated groups; and the significant capabilities of the latter to adapt their tactics and the ways in which their activities are financed. In addition, the return and relocation of terrorist fighters, attempts by non-State actors to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes also remain areas of concern for the Council.

With regard to the mandates of the various Committees, my delegation welcomes the close cooperation between them. That makes it possible to face current challenges, which include the constant evolution of types of terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also commend the progress made by the Committees and their expert groups in their assessment of the threat of terrorism and their assistance in enabling Member States to fulfil their obligations under United Nations resolutions and international legal instruments in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In that regard, my delegation welcomes the cooperation and coordination between the various Committees in the planning and implementation of their various activities, in accordance with their respective mandates and Council resolutions. Regular exchanges between the Committees and Member States to raise their awareness of the threat of terrorism; working visits to Afghanistan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines; and joint briefings in Africa and Central Asia, are excellent examples of that coordinated approach between the various Committees, which should be strengthened.

My country also welcomes the efforts made by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to rehabilitate and reintegrate former foreign terrorist fighters, particularly those in the Lake Chad basin. Given that information sharing is essential to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), my country appreciates the regional training sessions organized for national focal points. Those sessions have enabled the creation of an active network aimed at strengthening cooperation and coordination, both with the 1540 Committee and between the respective regions. Information-sharing further encourages the strengthening of cooperation between the 1540 Committee and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Implementation Support Unit of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL. My delegation also welcomes the actions initiated by the Committees and their expert groups to update the sanctions lists in order

to facilitate the implementation of sanctions regimes against individuals, groups and entities associated with terrorist groups.

With regard to the challenges ahead, Côte d'Ivoire stresses the need for the United Nations to favour an integrated approach in its response strategy in order to better adapt to current challenges. We also believe that more attention should be paid to measures to ban biological, chemical and bacteriological weapons; the financing networks that enable proliferation; and national controls on the export and transport of such weapons.

My country urges the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to continue its awareness-raising activities in order to combat extremist discourse and all other actions leading to violent extremism and terrorism. We also call for the updating of the Madrid principles on foreign terrorist fighters. My delegation believes that the root causes of radicalization must be addressed and that particular attention must be paid to risk factors, including psycho-pathological factors that can lead to terrorism. In that regard, we commend the work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Sanctions Committee and we recommend that non-proliferation and terrorism sanctions procedures respect fundamental freedoms. Finally, given that assistance to Member States is useful for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), my delegation urges the 1540 Committee to do everything in its power to settle pending requests for assistance.

Mrs. Mele Colifa (Equatorial Guinea) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to begin by commending the United States on its successful presidency in September. We also congratulate Bolivia on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October and wish it luck and success. My delegation thanks the Permanent Representatives of Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Peru for their respective comprehensive briefings on the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We recognize their leadership and that of their teams in heading up the three Committees, which are doing vital and extremely complex work that shapes the credibility and effectiveness of the Council.

Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to peace and security in the world. Through the briefings that we have just heard, we are aware of the progressive ability of terrorist groups to join and assimilate into anti-terrorist cooperation initiatives, adapt technological innovations and collaborate with international criminal networks and armed groups, among others. In that regard, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea commends the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), on counter-terrorism, especially its indispensable work as an informative and strategic forum for Member States. We also highlight the role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in monitoring and supporting the implementation by Member States of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and other relevant resolutions.

We urge that the role of the Committee be strengthened through greater collaboration with regional organizations by placing a sharper focus on building the counter-terrorism capacity of Member States and regions in need; as well as with a more inclusive approach towards Member States, communities and subregions that are affected by terrorism and run the risk of becoming sanctuaries for those who practice it. In that way, we can strengthen preventive efforts and avoid blind spots in the global fight against terrorism. For that reason, we also want to recognize the growing work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in the Central African region, among other initiatives. We likewise recognize the growing work of the Committees pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups and entities, and the important analytical and follow-up work of its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

Ambassador Kairat Umarov's briefing and the Secretary-General's seventh report (S/2018/770) on the D'aesh threat to international peace and security, which we are analysing at this meeting, confirm the disruptive potential of that group for international peace and security, in particular through its global network of regional affiliates, its 20,000 to 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters, including women and children, and its increasingly deplorable suicide attack methods. In that regard, we commend the work of the Committee as a cautious supervisor of the sanctions list its increasing collaboration with other sanctions committees. We also welcome the appointment of Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati as Ombudsperson of the Committee. We trust —indeed, encourage — that the Monitoring Team and the Ombudsperson will step up their collaboration

with Member States and regional initiatives through sustainable strategies.

With respect to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity they offer by briefing us on their contributions to the implementation of the resolution. Since its establishment, the 1540 Committee has endeavoured to raise awareness of the need to eliminate nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, their delivery systems and related materials. The Committee assists States with legislation, training and equipment and facilitates cooperation between the various regional organizations and Member States with a view to improving their practices and general preparedness to prevent the risks of non-State actors, specifically terrorists, illegally acquiring material or dual-use technologies, or trafficking in them. Despite all those efforts, the terrorist threat remains real, and the mere idea of non-State actors having access to weapons of mass destruction is a matter of great concern.

Scientific and technological progress, together with the globalization of world trade, poses new challenges for monitoring, including the financing, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, particularly for terrorism purposes. In that context, the 1540 Committee is an ideal platform for international cooperation to establish strong international barriers that prevent proliferation and, in particular, that prevent non-State actors from accessing weapons of mass destruction.

To avoid proliferation, it is imperative that the institutions in charge of enforcing local cross-border controls have officials trained in the technical and legal tools that govern the matter. In that context, we highlight the work done by the Expert Group of the 1540 Committee, which, through workshops and seminars, has promoted the sharing of experiences and practices according to the needs of each State with respect to handling non-proliferation activities. In the same vein, Malabo will host its first workshop in December organized by the 1540 Committee, in collaboration with the Government of Equatorial Guinea and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, to support improving the capabilities of our country's national institutions in the area of customs services and border control on non-proliferation activities. We reiterate the need for States with greater capabilities in the area of customs and border control to share their experiences, technologies and best practices with the States that are the least advanced in those areas. The detonation of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon would have a global impact. Furthermore, terrorists can take advantage of the deficiencies in the surveillance capabilities of developing States to bring in such weapons and attack the interests of developed States.

So far, 181 countries have submitted their national implementation reports on resolution 1540 (2004). We congratulate the Committee for its hard work and encourage it to continue spreading the Committee's objectives so that the remaining States also comply with the commitments and purposes of resolution 1540 (2004).

The fight against terrorism and for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the responsibility of all States, because no one can face those scourges alone. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea notes with concern the growth and evolution of terrorist groups in the world, and especially in Africa, where many countries are committed to sustainable development and peace. For that reason, we encourage States to continue investing in the implementation of the resolutions of these three Security Council Sanctions Committees. We also encourage States to commit to sustainable development, which is the best prevention.

Lastely, Equatorial Guinea upholds its commitment to continue fighting terrorism and working for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as weall to collaborate on those goals insofar as possible.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China wishes to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and will actively support your work. China also expresses its appreciation to the United States for the work it did as President during the month of September.

I wish to thank Ambassadors Llorentty Soliz, Umarov and Meza-Cuadra for their briefings. China expresses its appreciation to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism (CTC), and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for the work they have done

and the progress they have achieved under the able leadership of the three Ambassadors.

Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose a grave threat to international peace and security. The international community should therefore strengthen cooperation and adopt an integrated approach to effectively respond to the threat. In connection with the work of the three Committees, China wishes to make the following points.

First, the 1267 Committee plays an important role in evaluating terror threats and strengthening sanctions. Recently, on the basis of the Council's mandate, the Committee updated its rules of procedure and conducted periodic review of the sanctions list. The Committee has done something positive in selecting a new Ombudsperson. It has also strengthened cooperation with the Monitoring Team and the Ombudsperson and has continued to improve its working methods. China hopes that the Committee will strengthen its communication with the countries concerned and abide by the principles of objectivity, neutrality and professionalism when it comes to listing, exemptions and delisting. China also hopes that it will make decisions on the basis of solid evidence and broad consensus so as to preserve jointly the authority and the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

Secondly, the CTC plays an important role in facilitating the full implementation of the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions by tracking new terror threats and trends and by providing technical assistance to the countries concerned. China is happy to see that the CTC has strengthened its information-sharing and coordination and cooperation with other United Nations agencies through joint meetings and visits. China hopes that the Committee will continue its dialogue with Member States and engage in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, as well as assist Member States with capacity-building on counter-terrorism so as to jointly respond to new challenges posed by terrorist organizations that incite, plan and execute terrorist activities using the Internet and new technologies.

Thirdly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a real threat to international peace and security. It is also a challenge to be taken up jointly by the international community. In order to effectively respond to the threat of proliferation by non-State actors, the 1540 Committee should continue to work in a spirit of cooperation and dialogue and carry out its activities under the purview of the relevant Council resolutions and the Committee's programme of work. It is necessary to stress the primary responsibility of Member States in non-proliferation and to support them in designing their non-proliferation policies on their own terms. It is necessary also to adopt a balanced approach in the implementation of the provisions of Council resolutions and to build the capacity of Member States to implement those resolutions. We must also ensure that the assistance provided by the Committee to Member States is more targeted and effective and that special attention is given to the needs of developing countries.

Fourthly, the Committees' Groups of Experts should work within the framework of their respective mandates and the Committees' rules of procedure. It is essential that they strengthen coordination, leverage their respective advantages, improve their work and enhance their professionalism. At the same time, they should be more open to the views of Member States.

China opposes terrorism of all kinds and is firmly against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. China has adopted effective measures to implement Council resolutions and supports the work of the Council's subsidiary organs. China, together with the rest of the international community, will continue its efforts to promote international counter-terrorism cooperation, strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and work jointly to maintain world peace and stability.

Mr. Amde (Ethiopia): I want to join others in congratulating Bolivia on assuming the presidency of the Council and assure it of our fullest support. Let me also express our appreciation to United States Ambassador Nikki Haley and her entire staff for their successful presidency last month.

We thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this joint briefing, which we found very relevant and useful in the light of the common objectives that the three Committees share as important subsidiary organs of the Security Council in countering terrorism. I commend the Chairs of the three Committees and their respective teams for their briefings, as well as for their dedicated efforts.

On the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), we recognize the indispensable role that it plays in monitoring the implementation of resolution

1373 (2001) and other relevant resolutions on counter-terrorism. Ethiopia also appreciates the work of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in the implementation of the CTC's decisions and the expert assessments it provides, as well as its assistance to Member States in the implementation of Security Council resolutions on terrorism.

We believe that the promotion of regional cooperation should be strengthened and should also focus on those countries and regions that are most affected. We continue to stress that assessment visits to Member States should be followed by the facilitation of capacity-building and technical assistance where there is a need to fill existing gaps. In this regard, we would like to commend the role of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and other bilateral partners and their continued engagement with the CTC and CTED.

The work of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities is critical in overseeing the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council on ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in accordance with the relevant resolutions. We recognize the important work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in assisting the Committee's work and commend its expertise and professionalism. We always welcome the continued engagement of the Committee and the Monitoring Team.

We note with great concern the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials and the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists. The threat of the proliferation risk of such weapons is alarming in the light of recent incidents related to the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors in different parts of the world.

The objectives of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) could best be achieved through gradual control and the reduction of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, leading towards the total elimination of and a ban on weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, it is imperative for all of us to support the Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament. Equally important is the need to ensure the ratification of, accession to and full implementation of multilateral agreements on the prevention and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

The threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and returnees, terrorism financing risks and the exploitation by terrorists of information and communication technologies — coupled with the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists — remains an enormous challenge.

As you underscored, Mr. President, in your remarks as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), cooperation among the three Committees is of the utmost importance. Strengthening collaboration between the 1540 Committee Group of Experts and members of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the CTC, without prejudice to their respective mandates, requires attention from the Council.

We recognize that resolution 2368 (2017) provides a framework for the cooperation between the CTED and the 1540 Committee and their respective Groups of Experts aimed at providing support to Member States as well as avoiding duplication, creating synergies and facilitating coordination. In this regard, while welcoming the recent joint outreach activities and visits by the three Committees, I would like to highlight three areas that could be considered in efforts to further strengthen cooperation among the three Committees within the framework of resolution 2368 (2017).

First, as a follow-up to today's joint briefing, the Chairs of the Committees could envisage the convening of a joint meeting among the three Committees at the expert level to identify concrete measures or mechanisms that could further enhance existing cooperation, with a view to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their falling into the hands of terrorists.

Secondly, the three Committees could, in the context of their outreach activities and technical assistance and capacity-building provided to Member States, consider the possibility of the joint planning and implementation of their activities, as appropriate and where feasible.

Thirdly, while welcoming the existing cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, the possibility of organizing joint meetings and other activities in support of regional efforts should be further explored. Such measures will further strengthen regional efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, as well as counter-terrorism measures.

Mr. Vaverka (Sweden): Allow me to join others in welcoming you, Sir, to the presidency and assuring you of my delegation's full support and cooperation throughout the month of October. I would also like to congratulate the delegation of the United States for its excellent stewardship of the Council during the month of September.

I thank you very much, Mr. President, for your briefing today, as well as for your important work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Let me also thank the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan and of Peru for their presentations and for their leadership in chairing their respective Committees.

Since we met in this format in May last year (see S/PV.7936), there have been numerous encouraging developments in global efforts to counter terrorism, both inside and outside the Council. We have seen that, through concerted efforts, our ability to fight this scourge has improved. However, we are far from done; acts of terrorism remain a serious threat to international peace and security, and we must continue to develop our tools to counter and prevent further terrorist acts.

One of the most notable developments within the United Nations during the last year is of course the establishment of the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT). We recognize and appreciate that the Council Committees and the UNOCT are now working together to strengthen their coordination on a number of important aspects. The adoption of several resolutions related to counter-terrorism, such as resolution 2396 (2017), on returning foreign terrorist fighters, is another significant development. The effective implementation of those resolutions must now be ensured.

The continued cooperation and unity of the Council is a prerequisite for the further development of our ability to combat terrorism. Sweden welcomes the well-functioning cooperation and information-sharing among the three Committees as well as their respective Groups of Experts. The sanctions regime of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities remains a vital tool in our counter-terrorism efforts. It is true that Da'esh has lost territory over the past year. However, as many colleagues have observed today, that network clearly remains a serious threat, and there is also a surge in the threat from Al-Qaida. Continued efforts to improve the functioning of the regime is therefore key.

We welcome the appointment of the Ombudsperson, Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati. The Office of the Ombudsperson is of crucial importance for due process and therefore for the efficiency of and compliance with the sanctions regime. In future, we should look at some kind of procedure to ensure that longer vacancies in that key post are avoided. Currently only individuals and entities listed under the 1267 sanctions regime have access to the Ombudsperson, while there are also concerns over due process in other sanctions regimes. We should consider the possibility of gradually extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson to other sanctions regimes, as appropriate.

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism is a vital venue for dialogue on counter-terrorism-related challenges within the framework of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Continued engagement remains essential among the Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and other relevant actors such as civil society, the CTED Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. We recall the important discussion held last week in the CTC on the impact of counter-terrorism on human rights, and we welcome the efforts made to streamline human rights and gender issues throughout all the activities of the Committee and CTED, including during assessment visits and thematic briefings, as outlined by Ambassador Meza-Cuadra in his earlier briefing. Both of those perspectives are key, not least from the point of view of preventing terrorism.

Sweden welcomes the increased attention to issues relating to the impact on children of terrorism and counter-terrorism, which was made possible through last year's adoption of resolution 2395 (2017). We

thank the CTC Chair for highlighting the role of the United Nations University (UNU) in that important discussion. The UNU's research briefs on children and extreme violence fill an important void, and Sweden is considering ways of deepening its cooperation with the UNU, in particular on how to improve reintegration interventions for individuals associated with groups deemed as terrorists or violent extremists.

Resolution 1540 (2004) and the 1540 Committee remain an important complement to the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The threat from non-State actors is real. The fact that 181 States have submitted their initial reports on national implementation is testimony to an increasing commitment to address that urgent threat. This urgency has become even more evident as the international norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons has been repeatedly violated over the past few years. The evolving nature of threats from non-State actors requires us to stay one step ahead. We must take into account the rapid advances in science and technology in order to foresee potential risks. Sweden, together with Bolivia and the 1540 Group of Experts, will co-host an event later this month on emerging technologies in order to share experiences on that topic among Member States and national and international scientific societies.

The Council has repeatedly underscored in its various resolutions that all counter-terrorism measures undertaken by Member States must comply with their obligations under international law and has made it clear that failure to comply with international obligations is one of the factors contributing to radicalization and violence. There is no doubt that terrorists must be held to account and that there cannot be impunity for the atrocities they commit. Meanwhile, we must remember that counter-terrorism efforts cannot come at the expense of human rights.

If we are to succeed in eliminating terrorism, we must also uphold respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, both online and offline, as that is the basis for an open society, critical thinking and fostering resilience to terrorist propaganda. Let me therefore conclude by reiterating the importance of ensuring that all counter-terrorism measures are carried out in accordance with international law, including human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law.

Ms. Wronecka (Poland): Allow me to join others in congratulating you, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Council for October. I wish you all the best and assure you that you can count on our support. At the same time, I would like to express our appreciation for the excellent work of the United States presidency in September, and we thank Ambassador Nikki Haley for her leadership and the United States delegation for their professionalism.

Allow me to thank you once again, Mr. President, as well as your colleagues Ambassadors Kairat Umarov and Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, for their informative briefings, tireless work and active leadership of the three Committees. The results of the work of the subsidiary bodies determine the effectiveness of the Security Council, as the organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security. I would also like to commend the ongoing cooperation among the respective expert bodies of the three Committees — the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

First, I would like to stress that rapid technological advances in the dual-use domain continue to outpace national and international regulations. Non-State actors have become more creative in weaponizing new technologies. The use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and related materials is a dreadful reality. For more than a decade, Poland has had a record of fruitful and substantial cooperation with the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. With the support of those bodies, we undertook a number of initiatives at the national, regional and global levels. We call on all States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) by taking national and international measures to strengthen their capacities in countering the threats posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including through the development of national action plans under that resolution.

Secondly, Poland welcomes the achievements of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. Despite having been defeated in Iraq and confined to small pockets of territory in the Syrian Arab Republic, ISIL still poses a significant challenge to international peace and security. Al-Qaida is relatively strong in many parts

of the world, posing a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. In that regard, it is of crucial importance to keep the sanctions list updated and stay focused on the current threat. The issue of weapons reaching ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates should be dealt with through a holistic approach, including better border control.

Global challenges such as the threat posed by terrorists should be addressed by the international community as a whole. The tenth meeting of the Counter-ISIL Finance Group, hosted by Poland in September and co-chaired by the United States, Italy and Saudi Arabia, was a good example of that attitude. By sharing specific information on funding mechanisms, 52 Member States explored how to mitigate the risks posed by terrorist organizations and the potential exploitation of stabilization and reconstruction funding into Iraq and other affected countries.

We appreciate the efforts made by the Secretariat to address the needs of the end users of the sanction list through the development of a more accessible search engine and a mobile application. We call on States to cooperate in the annual review of the 1267 sanctions list.

Poland welcomes Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati as the new Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. We look forward to a productive cooperation given his important role in the delisting process.

Lastly, I would like to express our appreciation for the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Thanks to its efforts, we know better how to combat illicit trafficking, abuse of the Internet and the financing of terrorism. The Committee's special meetings, whether thematic or regional, such as the recent ones on countering terrorist narratives, on human rights and on Central Asia, are an excellent tool for keeping States informed and a platform for galvanizing discussion.

In conclusion, I want to stress that beyond States' efforts to counter terrorism, we should not underestimate the effectiveness of the engagement of international, religious and civil-society organizations, as well as academia and the private sector. Only by working together, and with respect for the rule of law and human rights, can we fight this scourge.

Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of your duties, and the United States on its presidency of the Council last month.

I would like to begin by thanking all of the Committees for their work, and their Chairs for updating us on the implementation of these important resolutions. I particularly want to welcome the collaboration and joint work being done between the Committees, as is evidenced here today. I would first like to address the work of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

No country is immune to the threat of terrorism and no region is exempt from the threat that flows from the poisonous ideology that underpins it. Only through collaboration between countries, within and between regions, can we defeat it. We need a network of willing and capable countries to tackle the terrorist threat. While much is being done bilaterally, the United Nations has a major role. A willingness to tackle this threat should of course be a matter of self-interest, but it also flows from binding Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. And while capability flows from the Committees, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee, it also flows from the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre. I very much welcome the joint work that we are seeing under the leadership of Under-Secretary-General Voronkov and Assistant Secretary-General Coninsx.

The United Kingdom agrees with the assessment in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/770) that Da'esh has evolved from a territorial entity into a diffuse, covert network that operates in a number of countries. Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain a persistent threat and challenge, and we are also facing threats to international peace and security from terrorist groups that have been inspired by Da'esh and Al-Qaida, in addition to others, such as extreme right-wing groups. Terrorist groups constantly change their methods and approaches, and we must be flexible and adaptable in response. As the Ambassador of Peru has said, a feature of the threat in recent times has been the outflow of foreign terrorist fighters from many countries represented around this table. But as well as focusing on that, we must now focus on returnees to our countries and relocators to other theatres. Nor must we forget the foreign terrorist

fighters currently in prison, and others convicted of terrorism-related offences who may pose a threat both at home and abroad.

The United Kingdom wants to stress the important role that the private sector, academic researchers and civil society can play in supporting Member States and United Nations bodies in countering terrorism and violent extremism. During the United Kingdom's August presidency of the Security Council (see S/PV.8370), we were pleased to invite a civil-society briefer, Ms. Joana Cook of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, in London, to share with the Council findings from her recent report on Da'esh women and minors, which enriched our understanding and discussion.

I would like to stress that sanctions remain a key tool in combating terrorism. We welcome the continued engagement and cooperation of all Council members in our international efforts to counter this threat, and I also welcome the appointment of Mr. Daniel Kipfer Fasciati as Ombudsperson. The United Kingdom welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee's Executive Directorate to address a broad spectrum of issues raised by recent resolutions, in particular resolution 2396 (2017). As others have said, a global passenger name record standard is needed, and we welcome the International Civil Aviation Organization project of the Office of Counter-Terrorism to promote its responsible use, and recognize the generous support of the Government of the Netherlands in that regard. Furthermore, we continue to encourage States to move towards the implementation of the Global Aviation Security Plan.

In line with resolution 2395 (2017), it is important that CTED assessment and analytical tools are updated and made fit for purpose, and that they inform the capacity-building activities of the United Nations, including the Office of Counter-Terrorism and its partners. We are pleased to invite CTED to conduct a visit to the United Kingdom in 2019, and look forward to working with the Committee in order to share good practices and technical-assistance needs. I also encourage other States to work with CTED to facilitate similar visits to their own countries. We can all learn.

Moving on to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to acknowledge the Committee's achievements, particularly regarding the completion of initial reports and the engagement of the Committee's Working Groups. We support the Chair and Committee's focus on practical steps to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), such as voluntary national action plans. We welcome the example set by Chile and Colombia in conducting a peer review of the resolution's implementation, and suggest that the Committee encourage other countries to do likewise.

We acknowledge that the Committee has played a crucial role in enabling the meaningful exchange of information between States, improving the matchmaking processes that better meet assistance needs and help to build long-term capacity. It is now time for the Committee to become more active and to strategically consider new and emerging threats. In particular, we encourage the Committee to consider responses to topical counter-proliferation issues affecting the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), such as emerging technologies and proliferation financing, and to consider the role of international organizations and multilateral forums in raising awareness of those issues. We hope the Committee will meet more often going forward. We encourage the ongoing work aimed at raising awareness and the profile of resolution 1540 (2004).

The effective implementation of these resolutions is vital to protecting hard-fought global norms and the rules-based international system. Let us step up our efforts.

Mr. Safronkov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to congratulate the delegation of Bolivia on the start of its presidency of the Security Council and to note the timeliness of today's joint briefing on three of its important subsidiary bodies. We thank the briefers, all of whom clearly identified the tasks facing the Council and the entire international community in combating the threat of terrorism.

We are grateful to the Permanent Representative of Peru for his detailed report on the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED). The core of the CTC's mandate should continue to be the professional and impartial assessment of States' anti-terrorism efforts. We recognize that the number of monitoring missions, including those carried out jointly with other Security Council bodies and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, has increased significantly, and we have taken positive

note of the efforts of Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov and Executive Director Michèle Coninsx.

We would like to remind the Council that paragraph 12 of resolution 2395 (2017) directs the leadership of the Committee to report to the Council on problems in obtaining the consent of States to country visits and concluding reports, as well as on how the CTC's recommendations are being implemented. We hope to see a detailed analysis of the situation in this area. We agree that providing information on current threats and best practices in the fight against terrorism is an extremely important aspect of the CTC's activities. However, it is very clear that the Executive Directorate's attention has frequently been concerned with topics such as rehabilitating and reintegrating terrorists, strengthening the role of women, protecting human rights and collaborating with civil society at the expense of its counter-terrorism tasks. Those are all important issues, of course, but they are not directly related to the Committee's basic mandate, and it is important to ensure that it continues to focus on the area of counter-terrorism or run the risk of losing key reference points.

We believe that it is counterproductive to attempt to transform the CTC and its Executive Directorate, with their unique tools, into a quasi-human rights protection mechanism. Introducing individual ways of working with some violent extremists and violent extremist groups into the Committee's agenda is even less acceptable, and in our view is a targeted approach to undermining the international legal base of counter-terrorism with the aim of exempting tame terrorists from responsibility. Instead, we propose that the Committee and Executive Directorate confine their focus to genuinely topical issues of countering incitement to terrorism and terrorist propaganda, in accordance with resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2354 (2017), as well as suppressing the supply of arms to terrorists, in line with resolution 2370 (2017). There is still much to be done in those areas.

Speaking of the unique nature of the CTC and CTED mandate, we would like to draw attention to the depoliticization and professionalism that have distinguished both bodies since their establishment. We believe that the attempts of some Committee members to pressure the Executive Directorate into limiting its collaboration with international organizations working on counter-terror issues are unacceptable. We hope that CTED itself will strictly follow its own procedures and practices developed over the years and will continue to be a unifying platform.

We note the work of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and consider it one of the Council's most effective mechanisms on the counter-terrorism front. We are pleased to note that this is Kazakhstan is in large part responsible for this, as is Ambassador Umarov personally as the Committee's current Chair.

We believe it is crucial to ensure the effective implementation of Council resolutions on the counter-terrorism sanctions regime with regard to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida. Given the growing presence of ISIL in Afghanistan and the threat of the further expansion of jihadists into the countries of Central Asia, we believe that one of our priorities should be expanding the Security Council's counter-terrorism sanctions regime to individuals and organizations that are part of or directly connected to the Afghan wing of the Islamic State's extremist organization. It makes sense to continue to concentrate on the problem of foreign terrorist fighters on the counter-terrorism sanctions lists who are actively moving to States of origin or to third countries from Syria and Iraq, in order to prevent and suppress their criminal activities.

We support the effective work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, whose reports are an important tool for our joint work, and we urge Member States to work closely with their experts. We expect the Monitoring Team's reports to be as objective as possible and rely only on verified sources of information. The Monitoring Team's country visits are a significant factor in its work, and we hope that it will focus on trips to countries that are in armed confrontations with international terrorism and States that are dealing directly with terrorist efforts. That is critical to obtaining first-hand information.

Resolution 1540 (2004) is a key, universal, legally binding instrument in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), requiring all countries to adopt effective measures to prevent

weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors. On the whole, we are satisfied with the implementation of the resolution. We commend the efforts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under the chairmanship of Bolivia, and of its Group of Experts, for organizing courses for national focal points, conducting country visits to develop voluntary national action plans, providing assistance to countries that need it and maintaining contacts with relevant specialized international, regional and subregional organizations. However, much remains to be done to achieve the main goal, the full implementation of the resolution by all countries.

Russia is working actively not only to implement the resolution but also to provide appropriate assistance to other States. With the support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), we have held courses on resolution 1540 (2004) issues for OSCE member States in Rostov-on-Don. In a few days' time, Russia's Federal Service for Technical and Export Control is organizing a seminar in Moscow on export control issues for member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Security Council must respond robustly to any violations of resolution 1540 (2004) and actions to help non-State actors to gain access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons. The challenges in that area demand that we unite international efforts and reject double standards. In that regard, we would like to remind the Council of the initiative by the Russian Federation to develop and adopt a convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism.

Today's discussion confirms that eradicating terrorism is possible only with broad international cooperation. We urge that practical steps be taken to establish an international counter-terrorism coalition.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.8365

Security Council

Seventy-third year

Provisional

8365th meeting
Wednesday, 3 October 2018, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Llorentty Soliz	(Bolivia (Plurinational State of))
Members:	China	Mr. Zhang Dianbin
	Côte d'Ivoire	Mr. Ipo
	Equatorial Guinea	Mrs. Mele Colifa
	Ethiopia	Mr. Woldegerima
	France	Mr. Michon
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Temenov
	Kuwait	Mr. Alahmad
	Netherlands	Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren
	Peru	Mr. Meza-Cuadra
	Poland	Ms. Wronecka
	Russian Federation	Mr. Polyanskiy
	Sweden	Mr. Vaverka
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Allen
	United States of America	Mr. Cohen

Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2380 (2017) (S/2018/807)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).

18-30484 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Maintenance of international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2380 (2017) (S/2018/807)

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Libya, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/887, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/807, which contains the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2380 (2017).

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2437 (2018).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Mr. Michon (France) (*spoke in French*): France welcomes the unanimous renewal, for a period of 12 months, of the authorization on which the action of the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA) is based in order to fight against the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking on the high seas off the coast of Libya. The unanimous support of the Security Council for the European Union's commitment to peace and stability in Libya is a recognition of the key role played by the EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA in disrupting the smuggling networks and in saving tens of thousands of lives every year, as the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/807) recalls. The authorization of the Council is a sine qua non, allowing the operation to have the appropriate means to effectively combat the smuggling of migrants, in cooperation with the Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Serraj.

The text comes to the point by renewing the authorizations under resolutions 2240 (2015) and 2380 (2017) through which the Security Council expresses its deep concern about the extent of migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean and the humanitarian, political and security consequences for Libya and beyond. However, it is regrettable that the text is not more explicit in recalling the Council's positions on that serious issue, especially with regard to the applicable international legal framework, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

As the report of the Secretary-General points out, too many migrants — many of them women and children — continue to risk their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. They are the victims of traffickers who exploit their distress. The human rights violations to which those vulnerable people are exposed shock the world's conscience. Moreover, the migrant smuggling and human trafficking fuel economic predation and jeopardize the fragile political balance in Libya. That is why the Council adopted its first sanctions against six smugglers of migrants in June, at the initiative of France and its European and American partners.

Finally, France recalls, as stated in resolution 2240 (2015), that migrants should be treated with

humanity and dignity and with full respect for their rights and that all States must fulfil their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law. It also recalls the obligation to protect the human rights of migrants regardless of their migration status.

Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I thank all Council members for their support for resolution 2437 (2018), which renews for a further 12 months the authorization for Member States and regional organizations to inspect and to seize vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya. I welcome the comments of my French colleague and his support for the resolution. We reiterate our full support for the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean and the critical work being carried out by operation SOPHIA in the Mediterranean.

Let there be no doubt — the resolution that we have adopted today sets out the same legal obligations regarding the implementation of those authorizations as resolution 2380 (2017), resolution 2312 (2016) and resolution 2240 (2015), which established the authorization in 2015.

The meeting rose at 3.10 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8366

Security Council

Seventy-third year

Provisional

8366th meeting

Wednesday, 3 October 2018, 3.10 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Llorentty Soliz	(Bolivia (Plurinational State of))
Members:	China	Mr. Zhang Dianbin
	Côte d'Ivoire	Mr. Ipo
	Equatorial Guinea	Mrs. Mele Colifa
	Ethiopia	Mr. Woldegerima
	France	Mr. Michon
	Kazakhstan	Mr. Temenov
	Kuwait	Mr. Alotaibi
	Netherlands	Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren
	Peru	Mr. Meza-Cuadra
	Poland	Ms. Wronecka
	Russian Federation	Mr. Polyanskiy
	Sweden	Mr. Vaverka
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Allen
	United States of America	Mr. Cohen

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

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18-30490 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear an informative briefing by Ambassador Joanna Wronecka, Permanent Representative of Poland, in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Wronecka.

Ms. Wronecka (Poland): In accordance with paragraph 3 (a) (iv) of resolution 1591 (2005), I have the honour to brief the Security Council on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, covering the period from 15 June to 3 October. During that period, the Committee worked on my recommendations following the trip to the Sudan. The Committee also met once in informal consultations to discuss the interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, and received the second quarterly update from the Panel.

On 25 June, the Committee issued a press release (SC/13391) providing a summary of our discussion during the 13 June informal consultations on my visit to the Sudan. In my letters dated 14 August, addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations and the Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, Head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and Joint Chief Mediator, I expressed my appreciation for the cooperation and support I enjoyed during my visit and encouraged the Government of the Sudan to continue to build on the existing cooperation with the Committee and the Panel of Experts.

In line with my recommendations, I sent letters to the Chairs of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, suggesting continued cooperation and joint consultations with a view to monitoring the presence and activities of Darfuri rebel groups in Libya and South Sudan, and to develop a common approach on how to best prevent them from engaging in activities that threaten regional peace and security.

I also sent a letter to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts and requested that the Panel prepare and submit for the consideration of the Committee statements of case for the possible listing of individuals and entities that the Panel deems to meet the listing criteria delineated in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) and encouraged the Panel's cooperation and exchange of information, as appropriate, with the Panels of Experts on Libya and the South Sudan with regard to the activities of Darfuri rebel groups in Libya and in South Sudan.

During the informal consultations of 17 August, the Coordinator presented the Panel's interim report. The Panel reported that there had been no major breakthrough in the Darfur peace process. The Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) continued to refuse to negotiate with the Government of the Sudan. Regarding Darfuri armed groups, the Panel considered that a split in the SLA/AW military force in Jebel Marra would likely diminish the group's long-term effectiveness. While the presence of Darfuri armed groups in South Sudan had declined due to diminishing support from the South Sudanese authorities, their presence in Libya continued to grow. The Government of the Sudan continued to transfer weapons to Darfur without obtaining the required approval of the Committee. The Government cited Security Council resolutions stipulating that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians rested with the Sudanese authorities, which required military equipment. The Panel also noted the further investigation of several cases of potential violations of the arms embargo by the rebel groups and their supporters in the region.

According to the Panel's interim report, ongoing clashes between the Government of the Sudan and pro-Government militia groups and members of the SLA/AW in the Jebel Marra area, as well as ongoing intercommunal conflicts, have had a negative impact on the civilian population, including various human rights violations and abuses. Human rights violations and sexual and gender-based violence against returnees took place across Darfur. The Panel was of the view that the Government of the Sudan needed to take immediate and concrete steps to protect the civilian population against continuing attacks and to employ

more concrete measures to produce sustainable results, including setting up a local administrative structure, fully functioning police and courts.

On 21 September, the Committee received the second quarterly update of the Panel of Experts, which focused largely on ongoing political efforts and peace talks. The Panel also reported that a significant number of internally displaced persons remain in different camps across Darfur, including in areas that have enjoyed relative peace and overall improvement in the security situation. The Panel also informed the Committee that a significant number of displaced communities continued to express grave concerns over the lack of access to economic and social services in an increasingly limited environment for the provision of humanitarian aid and other support, and that threats, harassment and intimidation remain an almost daily occurrence for some.

Lastly, during the report period, the Committee received an implementation report from a Member State and the Secretariat informed the Committee about the transfer of Committee files from e-rooms to the e-deleGATE secure portal on 30 August.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Wronecka for her briefing.

The meeting rose at 3.20 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.8367

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2018

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 8367th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 9 October 2018, at 10 a.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On 9 October 2018, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 8367th meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

"The President invited Mr. Colin Stewart, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, to participate in the meeting in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

"The Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries heard a briefing by Mr. Stewart.

"Members of the Council, Mr. Stewart and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views."

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